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INTRODUCTION
Online child pornography (CP) is a serious issue. For several
decades, law enforcement has requested a mandatory encryption
back door, referencing child pornography as the key motivation.
Given that law enforcement may never have such a back door based
on privacy concerns, the question arises of what can be done to deter
CP. Given the absence of a mandatory encryption back door, the
FBI in 2021 worked with a private company that sold encrypted
devices to hundreds of organized crime syndicates, resulting in 800
arrests in 16 countries (as the FBI had the ability to decrypt). While
this was a creative strategy, other strategies for detecting child
pornography are explored in this article given that law
enforcement’s decades-long push for a mandatory encryption back
door may continue to be outweighed by privacy interests. Potential
strategies addressed include a conventional tipster program, an
anonymous tipster program, a licensed private researcher system to
corroborate law enforcement claims, scanning by private tech
companies for CP content, and brief exploration of a narrow Fifth
Amendment exception to compelled password production (which
might fail constitutional muster).
OVERVIEW
To deter child pornography1, we propose a conventional
tipster reward system for reporting of preteen child pornography
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(CP), exploration of an alternative anonymous reward system (but
raising the concern of swatting), licensing of private researchers to
corroborate law enforcement claims about the extent and types of
CP in society, and a CP tax to support both reward payments and
hiring of additional law enforcement investigators. We further
observe the possible growth of private surveillance by tech
platforms to assist in CP detection, and we discuss private party
scanning from both a technological standpoint and with regard to
legal and policy considerations.
Regarding either an identified witness system or anonymous
reward system, an innocent person who encounters CP generally has
two options to avoid a criminal charge upon discovering such
content on her computer: (1) report to authorities or (2) delete the
content immediately. Given that some individuals may be reluctant
to report, providing an award system, either transparent or
anonymous, may stimulate increased reporting. In any reward
system, care must be taken to avoid a Cobra Effect of rewards
having the unintended consequence of increasing rather than
reducing online CP. Therefore, at a minimum, any system should
Information Privacy Professional/United States (CIPP/US), CIPP/Europe
(CIPP/E), Cybersecurity Fundamentals Certificate (CSXF).
** Farzana Ahmed is a 2022 DePaul University College of Law J.D. Candidate.
Farzana is the Editor-in-Chief for the DePaul Journal of Art, Technology, and
Intellectual Property Law. At DePaul University College of Law, she is
pursuing both the Information Technology, Cybersecurity, and Data Privacy
Law certificate and Tax Law certificate. Farzana is a member of the
International Association of Privacy Professionals and is pursuing privacy
certifications. The authors also thank Ethan Perbohner, a 2022 DePaul
University College of Law J.D. Candidate, for contributing research insights on
compelled password production below.
1
This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, Thomas Anthony Volini,
Esq. (1945-2021), who has enthusiastically supported all of my research and
writing aimed at the betterment of society. It is further dedicated to Christopher
Meyer, Tara Sue Huffman, and all other children who have been victims of
sexual or other abuse. It is further dedicated in memory of federal agents Daniel
Alfin and Laura Schwartzenberger who died attempting to execute a search
warrant in a case involving suspected child pornography. See
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/08/us/fbi-agents-rarely-killed-in-shootingstrnd/index.html.
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require a conviction of a suspect as a condition for payment of the
award.
This article proposes that any reward system could prioritize
preteen victims (i.e., victims twelve and younger) as this category
would target the most vulnerable victims and would exclude some
grey area instances of self-produced CP shared between sexually
active teenagers.2 Prioritization of the most egregious crimes and
enforcement efforts therefore is certainly an important goal to avoid
overreach, such as mass governmental surveillance of high school
students. One form of overreach may involve law enforcement
scope creep (or “mission creep”) where a specific type or species of
crime might be used as justification for enforcement efforts against
an entire genus of crime. Such an example is law enforcement might
use human trafficking concern as a justification for spending
massive resources on detecting and prosecuting ordinary low-level
prostitution offenses. Another example could be seen in the
PATRIOT Act’s reduction in overall privacy in society in response
to terrorism concerns.
Regarding licensing of private researchers, under current
law private parties are generally restricted in that research of illicit
sites could lead to intentional possession of illegal content. Thus,
society is generally reliant on law enforcement’s narrative. So, there
is a theoretical risk of fear mongering or exaggeration that exists
with respect to that narrative regarding lobbying for legislation or
funding. Accordingly, private party corroboration of law
enforcement’s claims as to the scope of the problem may counteract
suspicion of fear mongering as to proposed legislation or budget
requests. Providing academics and legislators with information
from independent researchers should in theory assist in
development of informed opinions on the issues. This article does
not accuse law enforcement of fear mongering tactics in the CP
space, but it does highlight this as a theoretical risk given historical

2

Granted, abuse of teenagers by adults is still a serious issue, but we suggest
that rewards substantially focus on the most egregious crimes.
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accounts of alleged fear mongering with respect to the war on drugs
and other situations.
While a private licensed bounty hunter system is considered,
it may be too problematic from an evidentiary standpoint to make it
feasible (e.g., defense attorneys questioning a bounty hunter’s
financial motives and tactics). However, further exploration should
not be ruled out, especially given the possibility that IT platforms
could potentially create innovative crowdsourced methods to
identify and deter illegal online content.
This article also suggests the possibility that the U.S.
Supreme Court should consider allowing compelled production of
passwords/decryption keys in CP cases (treating them like physical
keys), and penalizing failure to produce the keys, given the concern
that warrant-proof encryption platforms may facilitate widespread
distribution of undetectable CP. However, the authors are uncertain
how the Court may conclude on this divisive issue.
Regarding a CP tax, a fairness argument is that large tech
companies providing warrant proof encryption platforms should
strive to counteract the problem, particularly where they are
deriving large revenue from platforms abused by criminals. Thus, a
modest tax seems fair to increase law enforcement funding in this
area given law enforcement’s position that CP arrests represent only
the tip of the iceberg in terms of criminal activity in this area.
(Additionally or alternatively, a charitable contribution mechanism
or tax credit could be established for any reward system.)
In 2021, discussion arose regarding Apple’s plan to scan its
devices for perceptual hash matches. To deepen the technological
understanding, this article discusses the difference between
cryptographic hashes and perceptual hashes. Further it discusses
possible issues raised by such scanning such as false positive hash
collisions and concern over law enforcement scope creep.
Regarding legal concerns, the private search doctrine is also briefly
discussed. In the absence of a mandatory back door, tech platforms
should continue to explore tech solutions to detect only the most
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serious crimes, striking a suitable balance between privacy and
protecting society (e.g., law enforcement and tech platforms might
acquiesce to no detection of a variety of low-level criminal activity
to support overall privacy in society).
This article also discusses how the FBI and some private
parties advocate backdoors and a warrant requirement safeguard.
However, the possibility of abuse is discussed, including potential
scope or mission creep where law enforcement could take
advantage of newly gained powers for uses beyond the original
purpose.
CONTENTS
I.
Privacy Advocates Favor Strong Warrant-Proof
Encryption While Law Enforcement Desires a “Front Door”
A. Arguments for a Front Door
1. Law Enforcement’s Push for a Front Door is
Conceptually a Push to Expand Access to
Data Not Accessible Under CALEA
2. Platforms Designed for Children Should be
Accessible by Authorities
3. Warrant Based Access as a Law
Enforcement Tool to Combat the Use of
Encryption for Nefarious Purposes
4. CP Seems Disturbingly Prevalent
5. Law Enforcement Would Argue That A
Front Door Is Needed for Detection and
Prevention of Crime, i.e., the Ability to
Impactfully Disrupt CP Rings and Systems,
Given the Restitution to Victims is Often
Unavailable or Inadequate
B. Arguments Against a Front Door
1. Law Enforcement Scope Creep from Serious
Crimes into Lower-Level Crimes
2. Safeguards Not Being Observed by Law
Enforcement and Lack of Transparency with
the Public
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3. Government Front and Back Doors Have
Been Exploited by Bad Actors
4. Difficulty
in
Designing
Breakable
Encryption Products That Still Provide
Strong Protection
5. Consumer Purchases of Foreign Encryption
Products Creating Anticompetitive Effects
for U.S. Products
6. Law Enforcement Essentially Lost the
Crypto War of the 1990s
7. Backdoor Mandates by Authoritarian
Regimes Violating Fundamental Human
Rights
a. Apple’s
Perceptual
Hashing
Technique
8. Society Is Safer When Provided with the
Strongest Encryption Products?
9. Law Enforcement Can Use Other
Investigative Techniques Without Infringing
Privacy of Encrypted Communications
II. Considering Incentives to Report CP
A. Other Federal Bounty Hunter Systems and Their
Effectiveness
B. Proposed Systems to Deter CP
1. Prioritize Preteen CP
2. Funding of a Federal Bounty Hunter System or
Tipster Reward Program
3. Licensing of Private Researchers to Corroborate
Law Enforcement Claims`
4. A Private Bounty Hunter System May Not be
Practical but Should Not Be Ruled Out
5. Courts Could Consider Allowing Compelled
Production of a Defendant’s Password or
Decryption Key as a Deterrent to CP, This May
Violate the Fifth Amendment
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I.
Privacy Advocates Favor Strong Warrant Proof Encryption
While Law Enforcement Desires a “Front Door”3

Tension exists between privacy advocates and law enforcement
regarding whether private tech platforms should be compelled to
provide a back door to their encryption technologies. The following
sections discuss the important factors and considerations for either
side. Ultimately, this article concludes that law enforcement will
continue to fail in its quest for mandatory decryption. Thus, Part II
of this article addresses what might be done to improve detection
and prevention of CP.
A. Arguments for a Front Door

For many decades law enforcement has long argued for a
mandatory front door to lawfully tackle CP.4 However, this desire
has been outweighed by privacy and security concerns.5 CP is a
crime which affects the most vulnerable members of society and
tends to have lasting effects on the victims that current court
resolutions do not address. Existing regulations and resolutions
barely begin to create a sufficient legal infrastructure that can
protect society from the dangers of continued CP activity with the
proliferation of the Internet; thus, law enforcement continues its
3

Portions, particularly of Part I herein, are copied directly from Volini’s prior
work: Anthony Volini, A Deep Dive into Technical Encryption Concepts to
Better Understand Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Legal & Policy Issues, 28 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 291 (2021). Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss2/2. This content is reprinted
with the permission of the [University of Georgia] Journal of Intellectual
Property Law from Vol. 28, No. 2 (2020-2021).
4
As discussed in Part II below, Congress is contemplating a bill called the
Lawful Access to Encrypted Data. This bill would require tech companies to put
backdoors in their products to allow law enforcement access to customer’s data
with a warrant.
5
Swire, Peter and Ahmad, Kenesa, Encryption and Globalization (November
16, 2011). COLUM. SCI. L. REV., Vol. 23, 2012, Ohio State Public Law Working
Paper No. 157, Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1960602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.196
0602 (noting at page 416 that “[i]n 1999, . . . the administration shifted position
to allow largely unrestricted export of encryption technologies. Encryption law
and policy discussions largely faded from view.”).
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push for a back door. Certainly, bad actors would be inhibited from
downloading and sharing CP if law enforcement had an easy means
to discover such activity.
1. Law Enforcement’s Push for a Front Door is
Conceptually a Push to Expand Access to Data Not
Accessible Under CALEA

For decades, society has debated whether federal law
enforcement should be provided a “back door” (now called a front
door) to encryption products provided by tech companies, such as
Apple’s iPhone Data Protection technology.6 Law enforcement was
successful in lobbying for a front door with respect to wiretap orders
under CALEA (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act), which applies to telecommunications carriers, including
providers of telephone service, Broadband Internet Service, and
providers of VoIP.7 Under CALEA, providers are required to
modify and design their technologies with sufficient capabilities to
assist and comply with such orders. So, law enforcement has
historically pushed for a front door to aid their duties and work in
situations of particular national concern or societal danger that
traditional avenues of investigation would not suffice. Law
enforcement’s current push is for a larger front to encompass other
technologies not reached by CALEA, such as smartphone devices
or cloud providers (e.g., Dropbox or encrypted WhatsApp
messages).8
As part of this push, FBI Director Christopher Wray raised
concerns in an October 2019 speech over warrant-proof, end-to-end
encryption and disclosed that it wants a “front door” to lawfully
access communications with a warrant from a neutral judge upon
6

Kif Leswing, Apples Fight with Trump and the Justice Department, CNBC
(Jan. 16, 2020, 1:13 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/apple-fbibackdoor-battle-is-about-more-than-two-iphones.html.
7
See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-andhomeland-security/policy-and-licensing-division/general/communicationsassistance (last updated Oct. 20, 2020).
8
David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy and Law Enforcement in the Cloud,
49 CONN. L. REV. 1657, 1671 (2017).
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meeting Fourth Amendment requirements.9 Similarly, in 2016 FBI
Director James Comey publicly pushed for a backdoor to Apple’s
iPhone while seeking a court order under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651, to compel Apple to unlock an encrypted iPhone 5C
used by a San Bernardino attacker in 2015.10
Notably, both FBI Directors' concerns are based on the
admirable goal of detecting terrorism and CP, but a concern exists
that permitting a front door for CP may lead to subsequent scope
creep into other areas. However, law enforcement has provided
evidence for serious concern of society’s safety that requires
privacy laws to evolve with technological advancement. CALEA
provided law enforcement with access to information and evidence
they could not otherwise lawfully derive from the available
technology before CALEA’s enactment. CALEA has helped law
enforcement in investigations that require more advanced tools due
to the impact of technology in society. Providing a front door while
limiting it to certain issues like CP may facilitate similar access to
relevant information that CALEA might provide in some instances.
Law enforcement would ostensibly assert that privacy laws and
statutes providing law enforcement with the ability to protect
society may need to once again be updated to match the available
technology used in crimes and the need for access to evidence.
The desired front door would require tech companies to
facilitate lawful access upon law enforcement obtaining judicial
approval. Law enforcement would assert there is a pivotal need for
a new larger front door to prevent and prosecute cases of child
sexual exploitation and terrorism. On balance, society will likely
tolerate some unsurveillable drug trafficking communications
because they are low-level crimes. But with CP, law enforcement
9

Christopher Wray, Finding a Way Forward on Lawful Access: Bringing Child
Predators Out of the Shadows, FBI (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/finding-a-way-forward-on-lawful-access.
10
See Matthias Schulze, Clipper Meets Apple v. FBI -A Comparison of the
Cryptography Discourses from 1993 and 2016, 5 COGITATIO 1 (2017) available
at: https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805;
Opderbeck, supra note 10, at 1671 (discussing the government’s usage of the
All Writs Act to fill in the gap not covered by CALEA).
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would argue the significant danger to the most vulnerable members
of society is not likely to be tolerated. It would seem that a civilized
society should not tolerate widespread undiscoverable distribution
of videos and other imagery of infants and toddlers subjected to sex
acts and exploitation.11
2. Platforms Designed for Children Should Be
Accessible by Authorities

FBI Director Wray noted in his October 2019 speech that
Facebook has provided more than 90% of the referrals received by
the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC),
which now receives more than 18 million referrals per year.12
Director Wray expressed concern that if Facebook and other tech
companies end up providing warrant-proof end-to-end encryption,
they will willfully blind themselves to all content and eliminate the
possibility of lawfully accessing particularly egregious criminal
content. He notes that Facebook moving in this direction would
transform Facebook “from the main provider of child exploitation
tips to a dream-come-true for predators and child pornographers.”13
Communication platforms designed exclusively for
children’s usage should arguably not have warrant-proof
encryption. Platforms for kids should be surveillable by parents
because predatory adults may try to engage children on such
platforms. As companies like Facebook create new applications like

11
A fairly horrific example is described in Olivia Solon, Child sexual abuse
images and online exploitation surge during the pandemic, NBC NEWS (April
23, 2020, 2:01 PM) https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/child-sexualabuse-images-online-exploitation-surge-during-pandemic-n1190506 (where a
zoom bomber delivered explicit video of a sexual assault on an infant to
attendees of a virtual conference on climate change).
12
See Finding a Way Forward on Lawful Access: Bringing Child Predators Out
of the Shadows, supra note 11.
13
David Shortell, FBI director claims encryption plan would make Facebook a
‘dream come true’ for child pornographers, CNN POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/04/politics/fbi-facebook-childencryption/index.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 3:22 PM).
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Messenger for Kids or Instagram Youth14 this warrant-proof endto-end encryption can be a further danger to society. The goal with
these new applications is to decrease the number of children under
the age of 12 from lying about their age at registration to use social
media and prevent targeting ads to children.15 Facebook has said
that these children accounts will be private by default for children
under the age of 16 to prevent advertisers from using AI to detect
children’s age and target them as well as decrease the chances of
suspicious accounts from finding teens.16 However, this does not
necessarily solve the issue of predators creating kid accounts to prey
on children. Nor does this provide a real solution because children
can change the setting to public because they want to become
“viral,” “TikTok famous,” or some other modern “celebrity” status.
These behavioral habits of the more vulnerable and less
knowledgeable members of society show warrant-proof end-to-end
encryption may pose a greater societal danger to children as time
goes on and may create a gap in legal protection because laws and
statutes have not caught up and evolved to consider these real time
issues.
3. Warrant-Based Access as a Law Enforcement Tool
to Combat the Use of Encryption for Nefarious
Purposes

A general characterization is that the tech community
generally rejects regulations, such as a mandatory back door, while
policy makers are open to it. Technologists have argued that strong
14

Facebook has paused the development of its kids platforms after pressure due
to concern for children’s mental health, privacy, and other human rights issues
related to children. Oriana Gonzalez, Instagram pauses development of platform
for kids, Axios Media, (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.axios.com/instagrampause-kids-platform-scrutiny-4f42fa4f-4dcd-411f-b44a-33ef5f18436e.html.
15
Terry Collins, Instagram’s privacy changers: Will they actually keep creepy
adults away from young users?, USAToday (Jul. 17, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/07/27/instagram-teen-safety-updatefacebook-mark-zuckerberg/5381319001/; Samantha Murphy Kelly, Facebook
says it’s moving forward with Instagram for kids despite backlash, CNN (Jul.
27, 2021).
16
Id.
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encryption technologies should have no back door vulnerability
built in.17 This debate over an encryption front door will likely
continue indefinitely (perhaps gaining greatest support in the wake
of any significant terror attack), with legislators butting heads with
the tech community.
Another argument further supporting a front door is that
defendants in many jurisdictions are protected by the Fifth
Amendment from being compelled to share their password with a
court.18 This situation would thus bolster law enforcement’s
position that certain data is indeed warrant-proof not only from a
technical standpoint but also from a legal standpoint. Should the
government’s attempt to forensically crack a password prove
impractical, the government may seek a court order compelling a
defendant to disclose his password.19
Some courts view compelled password production as a Fifth
Amendment violation, essentially viewing this as compelled selfincriminating testimony.20 (As a side note, courts typically view
17

See Schulze, supra note 12, at 59 (noting “[p]olicymakers in general favor
strong encryption with exceptional, warrant-based access while the tech
community replies that the mathematics either support secure encryption
without government backdoors or exceptional access with significantly less
security.”).
18
discussed in more detail below.
19
For example, forensic crime labs may have smartphones or other devices
subjected to brute force encryption for many months without success. See
Appleinsider Staff, APPLE INSIDER,
https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/04/17/researcher-estimates-graykey-canunlock-a-6-digit-iphone-passcode-in-11 -hours-heres-how-to-protect-yourself
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (describing how some phone passcodes can be
cracked in mere hours while longer passcodes may take years to successfully
brute force).
20
See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25,
2011, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that compelling defendant to
decrypt his hard drive was Fifth Amendment barred),
State v. Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. 14 (2018), (finding compelled production of
passcodes did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination under the “foregone conclusion” exception to privilege); But
see Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 2019), (where the state's
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compelled production of a physical biometric identifier, such as a
fingerprint, as non-testimonial, and thus, not Fifth Amendment
prohibited.21 Therefore, if a cell phone can be unlocked by both a
fingerprint and a passcode, presentation of a fingerprint to unlock
the cell phone could often be compelled, but disclosure of the
passcode to unlock the cell phone could not be compelled in some
jurisdictions.) However, other courts may view compelled
production of a password as not Fifth Amendment prohibited,
relying on the foregone conclusion doctrine to justify the compelled
production: i.e., the compelled production seems to fit this doctrine
if the government knows the existence, possession, and authenticity
of the incriminating evidence because the production involves no
testimonial attribute.22
4. CP Seems Disturbingly Prevalent

generalized requests for multiple categories of communications, pictures, and
social media activity did not describe contents of defendant's cellphone with
particularity, as required to compel production of defendant's cellphone
password under the foregone conclusion exception to the Fifth Amendment);
See also, e.g., U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(finding compelled disclosure of defendant’s password would violate the Fifth
Amendment:
“In this case, the government is not seeking documents or objects—it is seeking
testimony from the Defendant, requiring him to divulge through his mental
processes his password—that will be used to incriminate him.”);
But see a contrary holding in State v. Stahl, 206 So.3d 124 (Fla. App. 2 Dist.,
2016): (“requiring defendant to produce passcode did not compel defendant to
communicate information that had testimonial significance.”); For further
discussion of cases on either side of this issue, see Fern L. Kletter, Construction
and Application of “Foregone Conclusion” Exception to the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 10 (2017).
21
At the time of writing, courts have split on whether the compelled use of
biometric authentication is permissible under the Fifth Amendment. See United
States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1186-87 (D. Nev. 2020). Compare
Matter of White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 F.
Supp. 3d 785 (D. Idaho 2019) (compelled use of a fingerprint to unlock a
cellphone was not testimonial) with Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
22
United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1186-87 (D. Nev. 2020)
(finding that an officer holding a defendant’s phone to their face in order to
unlock the device was a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights).
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One FBI news story found one website with almost 1.3
million CP images and identified 73 new victims.23 From 2002 to
2015, NCMEC analysts located and identified 10,500 CP victims
and 4.4 million reports were made to the CyberTipline.24 These
statistics show CP is not a rare crime. CP is prevalent in developed
and developing nations and technology and time only make CP a
more complex crime to solve. Leaders following the issue of
pornography and human trafficking have said that technology has
blurred the line of pornography and human trafficking (as the two
activities seem interconnected).25 The complexity of technology in
its ability to hide perpetrators and mask the true nature of their
actions, along with the apparent prevalence of CP, would seem to
support law enforcement’s continuing push for a front door.
5. Law Enforcement Would Argue that A Front Door is
Needed for Detection & Prevention of Crime, i.e., the
Ability to Impactfully Disrupt CP Rings and Systems,
Given the Restitution to Victims is Often Unavailable or
Inadequate

Some advocates are tackling whether victims can be
properly compensated per normal means of justice. They propose
that victims can be made whole with restitution.26 The issue with
focusing on restitution to solve child pornography is the lack of
ability to right the wrongs committed against the children. There is
also no way to prevent the continued circulation of the images and
videos that have been taken. The best way to combat child
pornography is to focus on detection and prevention.27
A front door would provide law enforcement with a tool to
effectively begin to tackle child pornography from a detection and
23

The Scourge of Child Pornography, Federal Bureau of Investigation (April
25, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/the-scourge-of-child-pornography.
24
Id.
25
Allison J. Luzwick, Human Trafficking and Pornography: Using the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act to Prosecute Trafficking for the Production
of Internet Pornography, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev.. 355 (2017).
26
Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, Vol.
103 J, Crim. L. & Criminology 343, 345-347 (2013).
27
Id.
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prevention standpoint: certainly, the ability to detect and
confiscate valuable evidence that would lead to the discovery of
possible victims, child exploitation rings, and perpetrators would
be far more effective than relying solely on restitution efforts after
the harm is committed. While the focus on restitution is crucial to
helping victims in the aftermath, detection and prevention
strategies are crucial to combating CP. While restitution, if
available, helps the healing process, in many ways the historical
focus on restitution is just a band aid for the real issue.28 Creating a
mandatory front door or reporting incentives discussed in Part II,
would be helpful to combat the CP problem holistically rather than
relying solely on restitution.
To elaborate on the beginnings of combating CP, finding
justice for CP victims, and the restitution movement we must
discuss the case that began the push for restitution, United States v.
Hesketh.29 The defendant in this case downloaded almost two
thousand CP images of children, including those of the plaintiff, a
child who had been exploited by their uncle.30 This began the debate
into whether restitution was appropriate in a non-contact case, a
case where the individual has downloaded, distributed, or acted in
some manner that does not involve the active physical exploitation
of the child.31 The restitution amount requested and ordered against
the plaintiff’s uncle was $1,125. 32 The amount of restitution the
plaintiff sought in this case was $3.4 million, which many hoped
would make it clear the significance of simply possessing CP, but
the case was eventually settled for $130,000.33
After this case, there were other cases for restitution which
created a divide between courts as to whether restitution is the
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.; United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165 (WWE)(D. Conn. Dec. 7,
2008).
31
Lollar, supra note 28.
32
Id. at 345.
33
Id.; Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen Childhood, New York Times, (Jan.
24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-canrestitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html.
29
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appropriate solution.34 Even with this movement, victims of CP do
not find real peace or justice. The plaintiff in Hesketh, continued to
pursue cases against other individuals winning more than 150 cases
in courts that agreed to resolutions with restitution.35 In many of
these cases, the courts ordered recovery in small amounts, most
between $7 and $1,000.36 The plaintiff still recovered over $3
million in restitution from these additional cases.37 Yet even with
these awards, the plaintiff has still grown up haunted by their past
and there is no end to the circulation of the already distributed CP.
This case shows the only other attempted solutions to bring justice
do not even begin to break the surface of justice nor meaningfully
impact CP.
To effectively begin to tackle CP, law enforcement and courts
need improvements in detection and prevention mechanisms for CP
and to find points of distribution. Finding points of distribution will
help find perpetrators and better achieve the goal the restitution
movement aimed to accomplish: deter CP activity and help CP
victims find justice. Continued distribution of CP plays an important
role in why society cannot find justice for CP victims. CP will not
be deterred if there are no real avenues to locating the perpetrators.
CP is a serious crime that continues to affect individuals even after
they have been removed from the situation because their CP images
and videos can remain on websites protected by perpetrators right
to privacy and continue to be circulated. Being able to access
suspects' phones and computers would be the first step to effectively
and meaningfully ending CP. Law enforcement needs to be able to
access it to end the circulation, identify perpetrators, and identify
victims who might otherwise never be discovered.
B. Arguments Against a Front Door

Various arguments against a law enforcement front (or back)
door have been advanced, perhaps based on a growing distrust in
society of governments (and businesses) having unfettered access
34

Id.
Bazelon, supra note 35.
36
Id.
37
Id.
35
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to personal data.38 Some key arguments against a front door include:
(1) concern over law enforcement creep where the front door is
established for very serious crimes or terrorism but eventually
creeps into surveillance of lower-level crimes, thereby creating a
police state;39 (2) concern over any safeguards being ignored by law
enforcement and a lack of law enforcement transparency with the
public in terms of currently used forensics tools and their
effectiveness;40 (3) concern over a backdoor being leaked and
exploited by bad actors;41 (4) a related concern that it’s
technologically difficult to design breakable encryption products
that are still considered to provide strong protection; (5) concern
over US consumers purchasing foreign encryption products,
thereby reducing sales of potentially inferior US products, thereby
creating anticompetitive effects for US products;42 (6) concern that
overseas sales of US IT hardware or software may decline if a
perception exists that they provide weak security on account of US
38

See Ryan Budish, Herbert Burkert, & Urs Gasser, Encryption Policy and Its
International Impacts: A Framework for Understanding Extraterritorial Ripple
Effects, HOOVER INSTITUTION (2018),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/36291726/budish_webreadypdf%20
2.pdf?sequence=1 (noting “Apple’s decision to offer end-to-end encrypted
messaging and full device encryption, both enabled by default, could be seen as
a direct response to declining consumer trust and concerns over NSA
surveillance.”)
39
See Schulze, supra note 12, at 59 (noting “agencies might dig up cases to
mandate companies to build in backdoors for more trivial reasons than fighting
terrorism, a phenomenon called function creep.”).
40
See Ellen Nakashima, FBI and NSA violated surveillance law or privacy
rules, a federal judge found, MSN (Sept 4. 2020), https://www.msn.com/enus/news/us/fbi-and-nsa-violated-surveillance-law-or-privacy-rules-a-federaljudge-found/ar-BB18IVqI; See also Redacted, 402 F. Supp. 3d 45 (FISC 2018),
finding “the FBI's querying and minimization procedures, as implemented, to be
inconsistent with statutory minimization requirements and the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.”
41
See Schulze, supra note 12, at 57 (noting “[b]usiness actors are more afraid of
the potential future effects of the government regulating encryption, which
might result in the widespread use of inferior technology.”).
42
For example, analysts predicted that the economic impact on US companies
attributable to the Snowden leaks was in the range of $35 billion to $180 billion
in lost revenue); See Budish, supra note 40, at 9.
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mandated vulnerability;43 (6) recognition that law enforcement has
essentially lost the crypto wars of the 1990s (discussed below); (7)
concern that backdoors are often mandated by authoritarian regimes
to surveil a population in violation of their fundamental human
rights;44 (8) concern that on balance, society (both businesses and
individuals) is safer when provided with the strongest encryption
products;45 (9) an argument that law enforcement can use other
investigative techniques to discover high priority terrorist activity
and child molestation without infringing privacy of encrypted
communications.46
1. Law Enforcement Scope Creep from Serious Crimes into
Lower-Level Crimes

When enacting a new law that undercuts privacy, an issue to
consider is law enforcement scope creep or “mission creep.”47 This
is a risk of enacting a law for one purpose, but then expanding its
scope to other purposes. The PATRIOT Act amended a variety of
statutes to broaden surveillance, including its amendment to the
Bank Secrecy Act, giving the government broad access to financial
information, arguably eliminating financial privacy in the United
States. The primary motivation behind the PATRIOT Act was to
deter terrorism, and this terrorism fear facilitated its swift enactment
to increase money laundering surveillance, which is sometimes
43

Id.
See Schulze, supra note 12, at 57.
45
Former NSA Director Michael Hayden belongs to this school of thought,
noting that “America is simply more secure with unbreakable end-to-end
encryption.” Id. at 59.
46
See Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors In The Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. On Telecomm. & High Tech
L. 360, 399 (2010) (noting “[i]f a suspect is important enough, let the police
dedicate the significant manpower to break into her home in order to install
bugs. Given the finite limit to the financial and human resources available to
law enforcement agencies, such a change in the balance of power, by raising the
effective cost of such surveillance, would force investigators to prioritize their
targets, and shy away from fishing expeditions.”)
47
Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Daniel R. Koslosky, Mission Creep in National
Security Law, 114 W. Va. L. Rev. 669 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/243.
44
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associated with terrorism. However, reviewing FINCEN’s website
reveals that the bulk of BSA violations relate to money laundering
or regulatory banking enforcement actions with no identified
terrorism threat (with some examples discussed below). It could be
argued that the effect of the PATRIOT Act was to augment the
government’s money laundering investigation powers using
terrorism concerns as the justification. This article does not opine
on whether this reduction in financial privacy is harmful to privacy
rights of law-abiding Americans, but simply observes that financial
privacy rights were undercut by the PATRIOT Act’s BSA
amendments with terrorism concern as the motivating factor for this
legislation. Whether and to what extent a free society needs strong
financial privacy from government surveillance is not explored
herein (e.g., arguments that a lack of financial privacy could be
abused by an overreaching government or an assessment of the
regulatory cost versus the amount of crime detected).
Another possible example of mission creep can be observed in
that laws allowing surveillance for national security purposes can
uncover evidence that may be used in ordinary criminal
investigations. A concern is that if the Executive Branch has very
broad surveillance powers in the national security context, then this
could lead to a police state where ordinary crimes are routinely
investigated under the guise of national security. However, courts
have noted that although evidence obtained under FISA
subsequently may be used in criminal prosecutions, “the
investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of
the surveillance.”48
A similar concern of mission creep should be contemplated with
new legislation focusing on CP. Just as terrorism concerns provoke
an emotional, fearful response in the population that facilitates a
willingness to reduce personal privacy rights, the same can be said
about CP, which often involves heart-wrenching stories of abused
children. Therefore, new CP legislation should be approached
cautiously, factoring any detrimental effects on privacy rights in
48

In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 726-27 (F.I.S.C. 2002).
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society overall as well as the effectiveness in combatting CP versus
and whether the effect of a new law will largely increase police
powers for non-CP crime enforcement under the guise of
combatting CP.
There is a general concern of government seizing too much
power over a society. One author provides several salient points on
this concept: “On the side of the government, there exists an
independent desire to promulgate its ideas and to survive, and it will
take whatever actions it deems necessary to do so.”49 “The
expendability of rights is more than a government contrivance.
Americans have been willing to relinquish their individual rights (1)
in response to fear, or (2) when the government has been able to
convince Americans that it is in their best interest to forgo their
liberties in lieu of their safety.”50 “Americans are willing to forgo
their rights during wartime, but there is a quiet expectation that once
the threat has subsided, homeostasis returns.”132 “While there is a
line of reasoning that the war on terrorism is an ongoing one,
because of the very nature of this war and its duration, our
government should exercise greater care in passing laws that affect
constitutionally protected rights. Congress must consider that laws
in response to a continuous threat have the potential to become
firmly entrenched in our criminal justice system. Therefore, such
laws should be focused and temporary. The Patriot Act is neither. It
is not a routine response during a time of turmoil. This particular
piece of legislation subverts checks and balances, ignores
constitutional conflicts, and assumes a permanent place in
American law.”51
Another observation is that once legislation grants the
government certain powers it can take some effort to negate
overreach either by judicial ruling or subsequent legislation. In the
surveillance context, the PATRIOT Act granted broad surveillance
49
Metzler, Christopher, Providing Material Support to Violate the Constitution:
The USA Patriot Act and Its Assault on the 4th Amendment, 29 N.C. Cent. L.J.
35, 50 (2006).
50
Id. at 52.
51
Id. at 52 – 53.
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powers, but it was not until more than a decade later, when Congress
cut back on some of that PATRIOT Act surveillance authority (e.g.
some limits on bulk collection) through the USA Freedom Act,
enacted in 2015 in response to the Edward Snowden leaks
concerning mass government surveillance.52
Law enforcement and the U.S. government have tools available
for terrorism or other serious crimes that might also be used for
lower-level crimes. There is also evidence of law enforcement using
such tools for more expansive uses unrelated to terrorism detection.
The Snowden leaks concerning the lack of adequate privacy
protections against government surveillance in the US exemplifies
the lack of transparency that exists concerning the vast data on
individuals the government has the ability to collect.53 Federal law
enforcement have routinely used Suspicious Activity Reports
(SARs) to convict drug dealers, even though a major motivation of
establishing SARs post PATRIOT Act was in response to terrorism
concerns. In one case, federal investigators prosecuted a student at
a university for shipping marijuana and selling to distributors at his
university.54 The use of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) to help federal
investigators to convict drug dealers is common occurrence.55
Similarly, the FBI has launched an encrypted phone service called
52

See Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1425
(2018).
53
Anthony Volini, A Deep Dive into Technical Encryption Concepts to Better
Understand Cybersecurity & Data Privacy Legal & Policy Issues, 28 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 291, 354 (2020).
54
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, SARs Help Bust $1 million Drug
Ring Led by Significantly Older Student, The SAR Activity Review, Issue 23,
Story 6 (May 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sars-help-bust-1-million-drug-ringled-significantly-older-student.
55
Id.; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Suspicious Activity Reports Aid
Conviction of Drug Dealers, The SAR Activity Review, Issue 7 (August 2004),
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/case-examples/suspiciousactivity-reports-aid-conviction-drug-dealers; See generally Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, The Value of FinCEN Data,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/caseexamples?field_tags_investigation_target_id=670.
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Anom that permits the FBI access to users', who are frequently drug
traffickers or other organized criminals, messages much like a back
door.56 The phone service secretly accessed and obtained about 27
million messages between 2019 and 2021.57 The value of access to
these tools, data, and information is clear. The possible scope creep
into lower crimes and individuals’ lives is a reason to be concerned
with allowing law enforcement overly broad access to private
information.
An example of law enforcement scope creep could include
the implementation of community policing. The original point of
community policing was to increase the involvement of ordinary
citizens in policing neighborhoods. However, there are many
instances of law enforcement personnel commandeering
community policing programs.58 In addition to law enforcement
leaders being politically motivated, the police have been “made
safer” under the guise of “community policing.” Community
policing was supposed to help communities achieve safety without
police who use a “weapons system” that makes everything,
including innocent individuals, look like a criminal or serious
crime.59 Government leaders attempting to invest in community
safety programs that provide safety without regular law
enforcement who carry weapons to enforce the law, the police and
other higher-level law enforcement individuals, like SWAT, are the
exact people being hired to staff these programs.60 In the U.S.
historically, the police have been the answer for every community
issue that involves disturbance or crimes. Even attempting to drift
away from using law enforcement in every situation, law
enforcement agencies have found ways to insert themselves into
56

Adi Robertson, The FBI secretly launched an encrypted messaging system for
criminals, The Verge, Vox Media, (Jun. 8, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/6/8/22524307/anom-encrypted-messaging-fbieuropol-afp-sting-operation-trojan-shield-greenlight.
57
Id.
58
J. Berkeley Bentley, Mission Creep: The Danger of Blurring Police Blue with
Soldier Green (Part 3 of 3), Huffpost (June 4, 2015),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mission-creep-the-danger_b_7512814.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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community issues like mental health incidents61 when a different
program may or is supposed to exist to help in those cases.
There is an ever-present concern of law enforcement overreach
which supports arguments against a front door. New statutes and
judicial opinions constantly evolve to counter law enforcement’s
natural tendency to overreach. For example, police deceiving
minors has been an issue for some time and by giving them a
backdoor this may increase in order for them to fulfill their
objectives. Illinois passed a law that bans the use of deception by
law enforcement with minors and will go into effect on January 1st,
2022.62 This law arises amidst the evidence of law enforcement
increasingly using this tactic to secure convictions. As shown by
data collected by the Innocence Project, 30% of wrongful
convictions were achieved by law enforcement use of deception
with children and later overturned through DNA evidence.63 These
statistics and Illinois’ decision to enact this law creates concern for
providing a front door on the federal level for CP. With a front door,
law enforcement in a state where there is no law banning deception
with a minor, could potentially creep into areas of communities and
individuals lives in a way they have not before. This popular law
enforcement tactic could make a front door a potentially abusive
tool that would lead to many innocent or non-CP related arrests and
convictions.

61

Andre Mouchard, A question after George Floyd: What do we want police to
do?, Mercury News (August 23, 2020),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/23/a-question-after-george-floyd-whatdo-we-want-police-to-do/.
62
Bryan Pietsch, Illinois is first state in U.S. to ban police from lying to minors
during interrogations, The Washington Post (July 16, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/07/16/illinois-police-lying-ban/;
Innocence Staff, Illinois Becomes the First State to Ban Police from Lying to
Juveniles During Interrogations, Innocence Project (July 15, 2021),
https://innocenceproject.org/illinois-first-state-to-ban-police-lying/.
63
Id.
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2. Safeguards Not Being Observed by Law Enforcement and
Lack of Transparency with the Public

Certainly, attorney client privilege is a safeguard for those
seeking legal advice which should be respected by law enforcement;
however, concerns have arisen of mass surveillance that does not
safeguard privileged communications. Specifically, the New York
Civil Liberties Union issued a report in 2020 discussing how
attorneys can increase their use of encryption to protect client
information from being sucked up by mass government surveillance
particularly in criminal defense representation.64 The report notes
that “[p]rivileged and confidential attorney-client communication is
illegally being recorded as a matter of course by contractors
working for the government, like the telephone system contractor
Securus.”65 This report supports that there is a real concern in both
the EU and the US over warrantless and technologically easy
government surveillance of communications and the need to protect
communications from this surveillance. Interestingly, the New York
Civil Liberties Union report encourages the use of open-source
encryption tools that would seem to remove the possibility of a
private party providing a back door to its encryption products.66
There is a lack of public transparency over existing tools already
available to law enforcement. Law enforcement is not informing the
public that law enforcement across the country is regularly able to
64

See Jonathan Stribling-Uss, Legal Cybersecurity in the Digital Age, New
York Civil Liberties Union at *3,
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20200924_nyclu_lega
lcybersecurity_final_2.pdf. The report outlines “concrete, accessible steps that
legal organizations, especially criminal defense lawyers, can do right now to
ensure their attorney client communications are not sucked up into a
government surveillance database or stolen by hackers.”
65
Id. at 14-15.
66
See
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20200924_nyclu_lega
lcybersecurity_final_2.pdf at page 19 ("attorneys should seek open-source
products whose source code can be publicly accessed and vetted –to ensure
there are no secret, government-prompted flaws that risk revealing client
information.”).
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break into phones – even small police departments have the
capability, or they simply need to send the phones to a lab.67 Perhaps
it is understandable for law enforcement not to publicly disclose the
investigative tools in its arsenal and its success rate (given that this
would publicly inform criminals of law enforcement’s strategies
and tactics). However, law enforcement’s sales pitch to the public
makes it sound like police are never able to break into encrypted
phones, and this is not true. Jennifer Granick, a cybersecurity lawyer
at the American Civil Liberties Union explains “Law enforcement
at all levels has access to technology that it can use to unlock
phones. That is not what we’ve been told.”68 The truth it would seem
is that sometimes they can break in and sometimes they cannot, with
one Manhattan prosecutor explaining “we may unlock it in a week,
we may not unlock it for two years, or we may never unlock it.”69
Certain branches of the government already have or are able to
obtain back doors with some contracted companies. The NSA has
contracted agreements with tech companies that would provide
similar features that essentially equate to a back door.70 The NSA
has had to change its policies concerning seeking these agreements
by weighing the costs and benefits of such an agreement being
accidentally used by a bad actor.71 These changes are in response to
actual incidents of bad actors taking advantage of these contracts
and back door technology.72 These incidents will be discussed
further below. The failure by the NSA to have enacted sufficient
safeguards to already available government backdoors creates
concerns as to all government agencies’ abilities to safely use
67
Jack Nicas, The Police Can Probably Break Into Your Phone, The New York
Times (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/iphone-encryptionpolice.html.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Joseph Menn, Spy Agency ducks questions about ‘back doors’ in tech
products, Thomson Reuters (October 28, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-congress-insight/spy-agencyducks-questions-about-back-doors-in-tech-products-idUSKBN27D1CS.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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backdoors – especially agencies who are not intimately familiar
with technology or unfamiliar with backdoors in particular.
There is an inherent difficulty in policing the police. As noted
earlier, law enforcement has crept its way into staffing community
safety programs and that is in part an issue of government leaders
failing to regulate and properly implement the programs proposed
and enacted.73 In the wake of George Floyd, some proposals of
police reform have included increasing transparency of police
misconduct because of the clear evidence that police use excessive
force.74 Law enforcement mission creep into mental health issues is
also why increased transparency of police misconduct is
recommended.75 Allowing a front/back door for CP may give law
enforcement access to sensitive citizen information and invade into
unintended areas of communities. With the historical reality that
police at times have overreached and are not always properly
watched and regulated by government leaders, even implementing
safeguards may not be enough to prevent unintended harmful
consequences to society if front/back door access is available.
3. Government Front/Back Doors Have been Exploited by Bad
Actors

One example that exemplifies some of the arguments against a
front (or back door) for the government or law enforcement is
shown by the recent SolarWinds hack. A few sources suggest that
there may have been weakness on account of government backdoors
that took part in allowing the success of the attack.76 The
73

Bentley, supra note 60.
Mouchard, supra note 63.
75
Id.
76
Shawna Chen, Dozens of Treasury email accounts breached in SolarWinds
hack, AXIOS (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.axios.com/solarwinds-hacktreasury-email-accounts-breached-e6a24240-2795-4c09-9056b53f20e47f37.html (noting Ron Wyden, Treasury Finance Committee Ranking
Member, stated, "Finally, after years of government officials advocating for
encryption backdoors, and ignoring warnings from cybersecurity experts who
said that that encryption keys become irresistible targets for hackers, the USG
74
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SolarWinds incident left almost 18,000 customers, including many
high-profile clients, with updates that left them vulnerable to
malicious actors.77 In the SolarWinds attack it is believed that
Russian Intelligence infiltrated the Orion system and added
malicious code.78 Perhaps the largest issue with these types of
attacks is that once they occur, the harm can be long lasting and
difficult to fix: “[n]ow that multiple networks have been
penetrated, it's expensive and very difficult to secure systems. . . [a]
former homeland security officer, said that it could be years before
the networks are secure again. With access to government networks,
hackers could, ‘destroy or alter data, and impersonate legitimate
people.’”79 Accordingly, it seems attacks exploiting backdoors
affect can have long lasting serious consequences, leaving networks
and systems unsecure for years.
The SolarWinds issue shows the widespread effect of bad actors
exploiting any possible doorway or entryway. Thus, having a builtin back door raises a strong possibility that it would be
compromised as bad actors will earnestly attempt any possible entry
into computers. The SolarWinds issue also highlights the long-term
impact of exploitation of back doors by bad actors. Permitting them
with more transparency and clear permission under the law is not
likely to prevent this danger.

has now suffered a breach that seems to involve skilled hackers stealing
encryption keys from USG servers,"); See also, Glyn Moody, The widening
Solarwinds debacle shows why the reckless idea of backdooring encryption
must be dropped forever, Privacy News Online (Dec. 24, 2020),
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/the-widening-solarwinds-debacleshows-why-the-reckless-idea-of-backdooring-encryption-must-be-droppedforever/ (noting, “key to the intrusion was the insertion of malicious code into
the Orion network monitoring software from SolarWinds – a backdoor in
software that was very widely used and trusted.”).
77
Isabella Jibilian and Katie Canales, The US is readying sanctions against
Russia over the Solarwinds cyber attack. Here’s a simple explanation of how
the massive hack happened and why it’s such a big deal, Business Insider (April
15, 2021).
78
Id.
79
Id.
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Secret encryption has been championed as a threat to national
security by some intelligence officials.80 The NSA has employed
contracts with technology companies to procure back doors without
a warrant in response. Yet, these back doors have proven just as
great a threat as the championed threat to national security by
intelligence officials. In 2015, the Juniper Network had an incident
where they found malicious code in some firewall products that was
supposedly placed by Chinese government hackers.81 Legislators
have considered the issue of these covert agreements between the
NSA and tech companies, but as of yet, the NSA continues to
champion the idea that tech companies working with them covertly
is too valuable a national security asset.82
Considering incidents like the Juniper Network and SolarWinds
incidents, there is clearly a great threat to national security as much
as there is a valuable asset for national security. The fact that there
are covert underregulated back doors being used today, is a greater
threat due to the lack of transparency to citizens. Permitting a back
door is more than giving law enforcement the ability to investigate
more complex crimes but also about creating a crack in some of the
most secure firewalls and cybersecurity tools in a world where the
Internet and technology are much more complex and pose greater
dangers if not buttoned up.

4. Difficulty in Designing Breakable Encryption Products that
Still Provide Strong Protection

Today, the US economy is based largely on online shopping and
other online transactions which leave consumers open to many
security and privacy concerns. The ideals of security and freedom
on the internet have shifted slightly, but the same economic and
security preferences exist. As footnoted in Part 1, Congress is
currently contemplating a bill called the Lawful Access to
80

Menn, supra note 72.
Id.
82
Id.
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Encrypted Data. This bill would require tech companies to put
backdoors in their products to allow law enforcement access to
customer’s data with a warrant.83 Creating security in technology is
no easy task and has taken a long time but is being undermined by
this push for back doors and for tech companies to comply with law
enforcement requests in such proposed bills.84 Any of the proposals
that have been made over the past few decades have high
administrative costs to consumers, government agencies, and
businesses. The complexity of designing security products has also
only increased with time. The playing field may have upgraded, but
the social concerns, security product design success rates, and
economic cost of implementing such backdoor law enforcement
access regulations has remained relatively the same.
Generally, strong encryption is desirable in IT products, and the
longer and more complex the encryption key is, the less susceptible
the product is to attack.85 However, implementing the strongest
encryption possible will make no difference if a back door is
provided to bypass that strong encryption. To use a simple analogy,
one could fortify the front door to a house with multiple locks, but
if there is a known way to easily open the back door, then fortifying
the front door was wasted effort.
5. Consumers Purchases of Foreign Encryption Products
Creating Anticompetitive Effects for U.S. Products

Mandating a back door in U.S. products may increase the
number of U.S. and foreign consumers purchasing foreign
encryption products to avoid the inherent security shortcomings of
the U.S. product. Consumer data is used in online searches and

83

Catherine Chen, Bill That Mandates Cyber Backdoors Will Leave Front
Doors Wide Open, CPO Magazine (July 21, 2020),
https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/bill-that-mandates-cyberbackdoors-will-leave-front-doors-wide-open/.
84
Id.
85
Mohit Arora, How secure is AES against brute force attacks, EE Times (May
5, 2012), https://www.eetimes.com/how-secure-is-aes-against-brute-forceattacks/.
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social media and helps drive companies' profits. 86 As consumer
data increasingly becomes a commodity, data privacy law conflicts
will also become an increasingly important factor in consumer
decisions of products.
Laws around the globe affect the encryption products that can
be created by companies in certain countries which can affect the
competitiveness of these companies’ products. The European data
privacy protection law, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) favors individual’s privacy.87 The GDPR has inspired
development of stronger security and privacy law throughout the
U.S. and the entire world (e.g., California’s recent privacy statutes
and similar laws emerging in other U.S. states). The GDPR includes
Article 25 requiring security and privacy by design and default, and
presumably many regions around the globe have developed and will
develop similar legal requirements. Thus, the sale of an IT product
having strong encryption, unbreakable by private or government
actors, would be a valuable competitive product worldwide as it
would be GDPR compliant and potentially compliant with new
security/privacy laws in countries outside of the EU.
Whereas U.S. privacy laws generally support competition
because it is more of a hodgepodge of laws focused on specific areas
of privacy rather than privacy at large.88 U.S. privacy laws,
however, are trending towards a similar general privacy law setup
as they continue to cover more areas and take inspiration from the
GDPR.89 The hodgepodge version of U.S. privacy laws makes
producing strong encryption products in the U.S. and purchasing
those products preferable. So, while consumer data increases in
value as a commodity, it is at odds with the importance of an
individual’s data privacy.

86

Erika M. Douglas, The New Antitrust/Data Privacy Law Interface, The Yale
Law Journal Forum, 659 (January 18, 2021).
87
Id. at 675-676; See generally GDPR, https://gdpr-info.eu/.
88
See generally Douglas, supra note 88, at 659.
89
See generally Id. at 657-661.
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To some extent, the less restrictive privacy laws have made the
U.S. market more appealing to businesses and consumers. While
U.S. laws becoming more similar to the GDPR, in some respects,
levels the playing field to some extent, the introduction of a front
door would likely shift the competitive edge to foreign products,
especially with concern to encryption and privacy products. While
in some cases the use of encryption and privacy tools, such as onion
routing, may be seen as suspicious and susceptible to use by bad
actors, there are many individuals who appreciate and want their
privacy to the most secure extent. In a world where the internet and
social behavior has made sharing one’s life the norm, there are many
who would prefer to avoid that lifestyle for something that seems to
be from an age of bygones. Many consumers want their lives to be
private and secure. Many want little government interference. Thus,
a front door may become a hindrance to the competitive ability of
U.S. encryption and security products.
While there is a trend to a more unified privacy regulation
system that favors individual privacy, there have already been rules
issued that raise the concern on the competitiveness of US
encryption products. Recently, an executive order was issued that
increased the priority of sharing information and data to the
government in situations of cybersecurity and threats.90 This order
is on par with the trend of orders that have promoted government
access to more information and consumer data for security
purposes.91 This trend shows that the front door may be available
on the horizon, however, with the competitive interest at risk, the
90

Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity, The White House
Briefing Room (May 12, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-thenations-cybersecurity/; See generally Scott A. Schipma and Paul F. McQuade,
Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity: An Ambitious and
Timely Call for a Broad Range of Cybersecurity Improvements, Greenberg
Traurig (May 24, 2021), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2021/5/executiveorder-improving-us-cybersecurity-ambitious-timely-call-cybersecurity.
91
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Cybersecurity Priorities:
Fostering Cybersecurity Innovation Globally (June 26, 2017),
https://www.commerce.gov/files/international-cybersecurity-prioritiesfostering-cybersecurity-innovation-globally-june-26.
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U.S. government may likely stick to its historical stance on the data
privacy versus competition divide: voting against a front door.
6. Law Enforcement Essentially Lost the Crypto War of the
1990s

For decades, policy makers pushed for the twofold goal of (1)
making the Internet safer and build impenetrable cybersecurity
while (2) allowing the government access to data. In the 1990s, the
push was for the Clipper Chip, a proposal which stressed the
importance of strong security while trying to permit government
agents to obtain keys to decrypt when needed through legal means.92
The key would have been imposed domestically because US
companies are likely to only sell domestically to reduce costs.93
There was concern about the security of creating such a key in a
society that favored privacy and freedom over government
interference to provide national security.94 Economically, imposing
such a regulation would have posed a great burden on companies'
administration and this regulation did not fit the ideals of US society
at the time. There was no realistic proposal to ensure the strictest
security in permitting the government agencies to obtain a key
either.
Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State95 provides a helpful
discussion of the history of the government’s attempt to regulate
encryption, initially through the Arms Export Control Act and its
accompanying regulations, and then through the Export
Administration Act of 1979 and its accompanying regulations.96 In
Bernstein, a mathematician sought a declaratory judgment that his
92
William A. Hodkowski, The Future of Internet Security: How New
Technologies Will Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH L.J. 217 (1997).
93
Id. at 246-247.
94
Id. at 236-237.
95
974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
96
As explained in Bernstein, On December 9, 1996, President Clinton, via
Executive Order 13026, transferred jurisdiction over the export of nonmilitary
encryption products to the Department of Commerce under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2411 (1991) and the Export
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1–.10 (1997). Bernstein, 974 F.
Supp. at 1291.
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publication of encryption algorithms was First Amendment
protected, thereby negating enforcement under the regulations of
the Arms Export Control Act and the regulations of the Export
Administration Act.97 The court sided with the Plaintiff, holding
that the encryption regulations were unconstitutional prior restraints
in violation of the First Amendment.98 The decision in Bernstein
and related cases, along with other public debate, likely paved the
way for the U.S. Government in 1999 to ultimately forego
regulation of commercial encryption products.99
If law enforcement continues to lose the crypto wars with
privacy interests outweighing crime detection, then perhaps a
fundamental privacy principle is taking shape equivalent to the
English and US criminal concept of Blackstone’s ratio: “it is better
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”
Blacktsone’s ratio is credited with the development of the beyond
reasonable doubt standard in criminal law and likely influenced
development of other constitutional protections within the US.100
Roughly applying this same principle to privacy, one could argue
that it is preferable to allow a certain amount of unsurveillable
criminal communications rather than undermine the privacy
interests of millions of law-abiding civilians. If the US supports
unsurveillable communications, this could potentially overrule law
enforcement’s long-standing request to have a readily available
encryption backdoor, which companies such as Apple have
resisted.101 While this extremely pro-privacy view is appealing, it
could pose some dangers as noted below. That being said,
97

Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1291.
Id. at 1308.
99
See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 7 (noting at page 416 that “[i]n 1999, . . . the
administration shifted position to allow largely unrestricted export of encryption
technologies. Encryption law and policy discussions largely faded from view.”).
100
For some general discussion and critique of Blackstone’s ratio, see Daniel
Epps, One Last Word on the Blackstone Principle, 102 VA. L. Rev. Online 34
(2016).
101
Lauren Feiner, GOP senators introduce bill that tech advocates warned
would weaken privacy, CNBC (June 24, 2020, 9:47 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/24/gop-senators-introduce-bill-that-wouldcreate-a-backdoor-for-encryption.html.
98
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concerning EU-US data transfers, if a strong terrorism concern
exists regarding such a transfer, law enforcement could potentially
order a tech provider, through the courts, to hand over the key,
assuming the tech provider maintains a key/the ability to decrypt.
7. Backdoor Mandates by Authoritarian Regimes Violating
Fundamental Human Rights

As noted earlier, a front door regulation enacted based on CP
concern could end up being abused to investigate ordinary crimes
in a manner that would bypass constitutional protections. The
possibility of overreach should not be ignored.
The potential for fearmongering by policy makers should not be
ignored. Preying on fears held by the general public can certainly
be an effective method to enact a new law, such as fear of terrorist
attacks, harm to children, or exponential increase in crimes. Such
fears can end up supporting enactment of laws, which might provide
the government with excessive power that could be abused.
The U.S. has a history of racist fearmongering campaigns in
criminal settings. The U.S. has been on the path to reforming the
cash bail system, but some law enforcement, legislators, and
communities have used fear mongering tactics to push their racially
biased motives.102 Opponents to the reform of the cash bail system
have made arguments that bail reform is a public safety issue, is
anti-police, and mischaracterize arrested individuals, especially
minorities, as seriously dangerous people who need to be kept in jail
even before a conviction.103 Legislators have also pushed laws and
regulations that contradict bail reform that have no basis on facts
that contradict their reasoning.104 The cash bail system has been a

102

Vincent M. Sutherland, The Racist Fearmongering Campaigns Against Bail
Reform, Explained, The Appeal (June 7, 2021), https://theappeal.org/thelab/explainers/the-racist-fearmongering-campaigns-against-bail-reformexplained/.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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tool that has been used by racially biased and corrupt individuals to
justify disproportionate and unfair arrests of vulnerable people.
The history of the U.S. using seemingly justified motives to
ensure public safety is why the motives of a law enforcement
pushing for a front door should be cause for concern. While CP is a
real issue, there is certainly some concern of law enforcement
favoring a front door for other motivations or using a front door in
the future for unfair purposes. While cited motives for expansion of
law enforcement powers include issues of terrorism and nationwide
attacks, some would argue that such powers are disproportionately
aimed at minorities and vulnerable populations including the Black,
Latinx, Hispanic, Indigenous, Asian, Muslim, Sikh, and other
frequently targeted communities. Thus, allowing a front door
whether for CP or some other motive, the U.S. should be prepared
for the real possibility of unjustified targeting and overreach with
the justification of improving public safety.
Cybersecurity experts have also highlighted that the recently
introduced Apple software tool for iPhones is at risk of being abused
to violate human rights. Apple recently introduced a software tool
for iPhones that flags cases of child sex abuse by scanning images
that are backed up to the iCloud.105 Experts have noted that this
system is highly invasive and infringes on people’s privacy and may
possibly be setting a precedent for surveillance-heavy countries like
China to pass laws requiring similar technology that the government
could use for pushing their authoritarian regime.106 U.S. courts have
tackled similar privacy infringement in cases concerning police
searching digital information from phones seized from an arrested
individual without a search warrant.107 In the Supreme court's
105

Brian X. Chen, The Lesson to Learn from Apple’s tool to Flag Child Abuse,
The New York Times (August 11, 2021), https://www-nytimescom.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.nytimes.com/2021/08/11/technology/personal
tech/iphone-update-sex-abuse.amp.html.
106
Id.
107
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that there is no
exception under the search incident to arrest doctrine or other Fourth
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reasoning in Riley v. California, the Court aptly noted that phones
and data cloud information are a proxy for one’s life.108 The Court's
explanation fits the issue experts have highlighted about Apple’s
software tool. The iCloud holds much more than documents and
photos, which together can already describe much of a person’s life.
For an authoritarian government or law enforcement acting with
biased intentions, this access would provide the ability to invade a
person’s life on a deep level because people’s lives are essentially
all on technology. This invasion and potential for abuse is why a
front door may lead to violations of human rights. Considering CP
and how many of today’s younger generation lives and breathes on
social media. To be able to control and access people’s data without
the proper protections in place, there are many who could take
advantage of this access.
Law enforcement and mass media have also perpetuated
conspiracy theories and fears arguably for their own purposes. One
such conspiracy issue is the Satanic Panic. The societal fear of
satanic cults began in the 1980s and persists today; the Satanic Panic
is an abusive fear mongering mechanism that is “the same as those
of previous periods of mass hysteria, from witch hunts to
McCarthyism.109 This fear mongering is why some individuals are
still in jail after persecution without evidence by biased law
enforcement feeding off the social concern.110 Recently, Satanic
Panic has been used to accuse Lil Nas X of being a corrupting
influence.111 Law enforcement and legal entities have thoroughly
proven that this panic is an irrational fear that has only resulted in
other injustices such as the spread of misinformation of AIDS and
persecution of the LGBTQ community for false claims of satanic

Amendment doctrine exception that would allow police to search digital
information from a phone seized from an arrested individual.).
108
Id. at 394-397.
109
Aja Romano, Why Satanic Panic never really ended, Vox (March 31,2021,
2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/culture/22358153/satanic-panic-ritual-abusehistory-conspiracy-theories-explained.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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involvement.112 The long and persistent Satanic Panic is an example
of using spiraling investigations and wild claims of dangers to
national security that are a serious potential threat into people’s
privacy and personal information. With a “phone acting as a proxy
for one’s life” law enforcement could use front door access while
continuing to present no evidence to invade privacy on the claim
that they will find evidence.
a. Apple’s Perceptual Hashing Technique

A form of back door, designed by Apple to detect possible CP,
is called “neuralMatch.” The tool will scan images before they are
uploaded and any matched images will be reviewed by a human.113
Notably, this scan will be a local scan of the device rather than the
Cloud. If the matched image is confirmed as CP, the user’s account
will be disabled, and Apple will notify the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children.114 Using this alternative technique
may be a useful and effective way of combating CP early on as the
detection process occurs before they are uploaded to the Cloud.
Perceptual hashing has an advantage over cryptographic
hashing in that perceptual hashing will look for similarities between
two images, while a cryptographic hash is used to detect whether a
suspect image is identical to a known image. In this regard, a bad
actor could make small changes to a known illegal image (e.g., add
a couple of pixels) and would bypass detection of a cryptographic
hash; however, the perceptual hashing algorithm should still detect
substantial similarity between the two images.
The inner mechanisms of the neuralMatch scan and perceptual
hashing techniques work by using an algorithm that uses a 96-bit
112

Id.
Frank Bakjak and Barbara Ortutay, Apple to scan U.S. iPhones for images of
child sexual abuse, The Associated Press (August 6, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-child-abuse-apple-inc7fe2a09427d663cda8addfeeffc40196.
114
Id.
113
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unique identifier to match images that are the same or very
similar.115 It is possible for two images to have the same dataset but
to be different images resulting in a false positive match, however,
Apple claims their system only found 3 false-positives in a test of
100 million.116 According to Apple, such false positives and any
other matches will be verified and reviewed by an independent
network before escalating the situation to law enforcement.117
Perceptual hashing has been successfully used in various
contexts.118 For example, perceptual hashing has been used to check
for copyright infringement of images or works.119 A common site
that uses perceptual hash is YouTube which will screen videos when
uploaded and review videos that have been flagged by users or
copyright holders.120 Considering copyright infringement, there
have often been false positives that sometimes leave users at a
disadvantage and inability to upload new works.121 These
applications highlight the success and issues of perceptual hashing
and how individuals encounter it in their everyday lives.
Perceptual hashing shows some potential to combat CP given its
success in other areas. However, care should be exercised with
115

Brad Dwyer, ImageNet contains naturally occurring NeuralHash collisions,
Roboflow, Inc. (August 19, 2021), https://blog.roboflow.com/neuralhashcollision/.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Pete Wayner, What is a perceptual hash function?, VentureBeat, (August 24,
2021, 4:40 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2021/08/24/what-is-a-perceptual-hashfunction/; See also Evan Klinger and David Strakweather, pHash, The Open
Source Perceptual Hash Library, https://www.phash.org/.
119
Pete Wayner, What is a perceptual hash function?, VentureBeat, (August 24,
2021, 4:40 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2021/08/24/what-is-a-perceptual-hashfunction/; See also Evan Klinger and David Strakweather, pHash, The Open
Source Perceptual Hash Library, https://www.phash.org/.
120
Kate Klonick, The New Governors The People, Rules, and Process
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1599 (2018); See also Rfraimow,
Adventures in Perceptual Hashing, American Archive of Public Broadcasting,
(April 20, 2017), https://blog.americanarchive.org/2017/04/20/adventures-inperceptual-hashing/.
121
Id.
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respect to issues of false positives or even the possibility of bad
actors injecting poisoned images onto an innocent users device. As
mentioned in the previous section, care should also be taken to
minimize putting society at risk of violation of human rights if for
example perceptual hashing is used for mass surveillance and
detection/prosecution of ordinary crimes unrelated to CP. The
viability of a tool such as Apple’s neuralMatch will have to be
followed closely in the future. As some advocates and researchers
have stated, this hashing tool essentially gives law enforcement,
governments, and anyone with access to scanning and searching
personal devices for any possible illegitimate act which is
dangerous on multiple facets: for businesses, national security,
public safety, and privacy.122
8. Society is Safer When Provided with the Strongest
Encryption Products?

If privacy interests favor warrant proof encryption technologies,
this raises a fundamental question of the value of privacy in a free
society balanced against the need or desire for law enforcement to
investigate criminal or terrorist activity. Likewise, this raises a
larger related question, beyond the scope of this article, of what it
means to live in a free society and how privacy rights fit within that
free society. Certainly, if the government or private organizations
(or some combination of the two) can easily review everyone’s
communications from both a routing standpoint (i.e., the “from” and
“to” fields of a data packet) and a content standpoint (i.e., the
payload of a data packet), then this unfettered access to emails, text
messages, voicemails, search history, and current/past location may
exemplify a society that is not free. Strong encryption can thus be a
helpful tool to increase freedom through privacy of
communications, hiding not only the routing info/identity of the
communicating parties (e.g., “from” and “to” info) but also the
contents of the messages themselves (e.g., payload of data packets).
122

Kellen Browning, Cybersecurity Experts Sound Alarm on Apple and E.U.
Phone Scanning Plans, New York Times, (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/14/business/apple-child-sex-abusecybersecurity.html.
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US government policy, both legislative and judicial, may thus
continue to shift toward stronger protection of personal data.123
Although there are theories that data privacy and use of data as
a competitive tool are integrated and interconnected components,
there is a “separatist” theory that data privacy and competitive tools
should remain separate. This separatist thought is focused on the
idea that society is safe and has an inherent need for secure privacy
and the competitive aspect of data should be considered
separately.124 The FTC has faced situations in which their
competing duties concerning competition and privacy clashed, and
typically the winning factor in their decisions is competition even
though privacy could be just as convincing.125 This de facto
consideration is concerning as it shows people’s lives, that
technology and a phone act as a proxy for and hold all of the
information via data, is no longer being considered a “life” but
rather another commodity. Privacy should be considered a greater
and more important factor than competition. The GDPR and other
privacy programs tend to lean that way, but the U.S. is seemingly
trending away from accepting that data today is essentially like
one’s diary and photo books in the past. Arguably, strong encryption
products are the principal way to ensure that people’s lives which
today exist in essentially identical digital format and in physical
tangible day to day activities are protected and not seen as a
commodity.
9. Law Enforcement Can Use Other Investigative Techniques
Without Infringing Privacy of Encrypted Communications

Decrypted access to individuals’ data would make law
enforcement’s work simpler, but this access may not be necessary
123

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) noting that “many of the
more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the
intimate.” In my view, this evidences the judicial awareness of highly personal
data maintained by many people in the United States and the need to safeguard
this same data.
124
Douglas, supra note 88, at 653-656.
125
Id.
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to their work. There are arguments that law enforcement could
acquire court orders to compel an individual to give law
enforcement access to their password protected devices.126 Law
enforcement often cannot compel individuals to enter passwords
because this raises Fifth Amendment issues.127 So, unless there is
an amendment to the law, court orders or search warrants may be
alternative techniques that law enforcement may use and are already
familiar with.
Courts have held that police may search data on devices, such
as a phone or computer, if they first secure a warrant before
conducting such a search but the search incident to arrest does not
permit police officers to search data on technology present at the
time of the arrest.128 This restriction is no greater than the
jurisdictional requirements set by the Pen Register Trap and Trace
Statute129 or the Wire Tap Act130 which are used for similar
purposes as what a Front Door may be used for.131 Thus, police have
used court orders and search warrants to obtain data and other
information that can only be obtained through searching technology
in some manner.
Using a search warrant and other means to obtain an extensive,
and possibly overbroad, amount of data information is not foreign
to police. Investigators can serve keyword warrants which ask
126

Reema Shah, Law Enforcement and Data Privacy: A Forward-Looking
Approach, Yale L.J. p. 555 (2015).
127
Id.
128
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. at 386 (Reasoning that there are no comparable
risks of destruction of evidence as found in other search incident to arrest cases
when the search is of digital data); See also Shah, supra at 128, at 547-549.
129
The Pen Register Trap and Trace Statute requires law enforcement to get a
court order.
130
The Wire Tap Act has a “warrant plus” requirement which is a higher
standard than obtaining a regular warrant.
131
18 U.S.C. 2701; 18 U.S.C. 3121; see also Center for Democracy and
Technology, CDT’s Analysis of S. 2092: Amending the Pen Register and Trap
and Trace Statute in Response to Recent Internet Denial of Service Attacks and
to Establish Meaningful Privacy Protections (2000), https://cdt.org/wpcontent/uploads/security/000404amending.shtml.
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companies to provide information on any users who searched for
the applicable “keyword” such as a victim’s name or address.132
Law enforcement have also used reverse search warrants which aid
them in searching for a suspect without having an actual suspect and
allow them to ask for a broad set of information to come up with an
actual suspect.133 There are apps that have sold data on users to
government agencies, which could include law enforcement
because it is legal for them to purchase this information.134
Especially in situations concerning police targeting based on race or
vulnerable populations, law enforcement’s access to commercial
and state surveillance has grown.135 Considering the access police
have and the extent to which they already use this access, law
enforcement likely does not need a more easily accessible tool to
search and access data.
Law enforcement does not necessarily need another avenue
when they have other investigative techniques available to them.
Search warrants and court orders have been available since before
technology and data became important factors in individuals’ lives.
Law enforcement has also used search warrants and court orders to
access data and information on technology for decades. Law
enforcement can also use tools that are legal but not provided
through the courts such as purchasing data from data brokers. There
are more than enough avenues for police and investigators to obtain
and access the data they need. Access to a front door might only
create a new simpler avenue with fewer checks on law enforcement
to obtain private data.

132

Sidney Fussell, How Your Digital Trails Wind Up in the Police’s Hands,
WIRED, (December 28, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/your-digital-trailspolices-hands/.
133
Sara Morrison, Read the privacy policy: police can easily get your data from
third parties, Vox Media, L.L.C., (July 31, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/22565926/police-law-enforcement-data-warrant.
134
Fussell, How Your Digital Trails Wind Up in the Police’s Hands, supra note
134; Morrison, Read the privacy policy: police can easily get your data from
third parties, supra note 135.
135
Fussell, supra note 134.
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Considering Incentives to Report CP

Given law enforcement’s claim that horrific CP is widespread
and that they are only able to investigate the tip of the iceberg,136 it
would seem that some measures should be taken to corroborate this
claim and to combat the problem. Also, given that law enforcement
will likely continue to lose on its push for an encryption back door,
the question remains of how society can combat secret sharing of
child pornography online. In a sense, secret sharing of such
contraband can never be fully eradicated as criminals (particularly
tech savvy criminals) will always look for ways to hide their
activities from authorities regardless of what investigative tools
exist. Therefore, a sensible goal is to make such sharing difficult
rather than widespread and easy. We propose exploration of a
bounty or whistleblower system that might reward a recipient of
child pornography for simply handing information over to
authorities. To avoid a Cobra Effect (described below), a reward
system should only pay a reward where the information leads to the
arrest and conviction of a suspect.
The existing deterrent under U.S. law is significant jail time for
possession or distribution of child pornography. A further deterrent
would involve a bounty paid to anonymous or identified recipients
to report child pornography to the relevant tech platform orlaw
enforcement.
Under federal law, when a private individual accidentally
receives child pornography, he is required to either immediately
delete the content or immediately report same to authorities to avoid
a criminal charge for possession of the material (however, under
various state laws, IT professionals may have an affirmative duty to

136

Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1 (2011)(noting a 2011 DOJ report estimating the existence
of 14 million child pornography websites).
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report CP rather than delete).137 In addition to avoiding a criminal
charge, payment of a bounty could be a further reporting incentive
for any private individual, and reporting the news of such bounty
payments could stimulate further reporting.
A. Other Federal Bounty Hunter Systems and Their
Effectiveness

The United States and the many federal agencies within it have
long used bounty schemes to incentivize and pay informants to help
infiltrate criminal organizations and to help increase the
effectiveness of catching criminals and solving crimes within the
United States borders.138 The general structure of a federal bounty
scheme is the federal government providing incentives to
informants by offering the informants a monetary reward, such as a
percentage of the legal action the government decides to take based
on the information obtained by the informant.139 The federal
government essentially partners and establishes working
relationships with United States citizens to help protect the people
within the United States’ borders by minimizing crime through
voluntarily enlisting citizen informants.
The debate over whether federal bounty programs should be
continued or not is generally centered on if the potential moral or
ethical lines that bounty programs potentially cross is outweighed
by the successful results these programs produce. However, despite
137

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d): “It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of
violating subsection (a)(5) that the defendant-(1) possessed less than three images of child pornography; and
(2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person,
other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy thereof-(A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or
(B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency
access to each such image.”
Regarding state law, Illinois is one example of a state requiring an IT
professional to report CP to the Cyber Tip Line at the National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children. See 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4.5.
138
Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching For Dollars: The
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 4 UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1999).
139
Id.
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the potential moral implications of federal bounty programs, federal
bounty programs remain prevalent because they have produced
successful results.140
Another example showing the expansion of bounty programs is
the Narcotics Reward Program (“NRP”) which was “established by
Congress in 1986 as a tool to assist the U.S. Government in
identifying and bringing to justice major violators of U.S. narcotics
laws responsible for bringing hundreds of tons of illicit drugs into
the United States each year.”141 The NRP, in just the past five years
alone, has “distributed almost $32 million to 33 people, with some
receiving as much as $5 million, according to the State Department
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.142
Further, since the NRP’s creation, the program has resulted in the
arrest of almost 70 foreign major violators.143 Therefore, the success
or effectiveness of the federal bounty programs should not be
measured by the potential moral or ethical lines the programs may
cross, but whether the programs are achieving the goals they were
created for.
By simply looking at the results of one bounty program created
by the federal government, specifically the NRP, it can be seen these
programs are doing just what they intended to do. A similar program
could be used with the same level of success and effectiveness if
applied to CP. Such a program would provide an opportunity to
citizens to help aid in the fight against CP and other child abuse
crimes. Considering the sensitivity surrounding CP, a direct
personal benefit may be the push citizens need to overcome the
qualms against reporting incidents of CP. The partnership a federal
bounty program would ultimately create between the federal
government and the citizen informants is arguably essential to
140

Id. at 1143.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Narcotics Reward Program, U.S. DEPT’ OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/inl-rewards-program/narcotics-rewards-program/.
142
Olivia Carville, America's Multimillion-Dollar Bounty Program Just For
Drug Lords, FEDERAL PRACTICE GROUP (Nov. 9, 2018, 1:48 PM),
https://fedpractice.com/2018/11/09/americas-multimillion-dollar-bountyprogram-just-for-drug-lords/.
143
Id.
141
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successfully solving CP and tackling it from the beginning and its
point of distribution.
The NRP is not the only example emphasizing the effectiveness
of federal bounty programs. With the internet and technology
continuously expanding, the federal government has also begun to
develop “bug-bounty programs,” as a result of seeing the success
corporations have had with these types of bounty programs.144 Bug
bounty programs use computer-security experts to hack into
existing infrastructures and expose existing vulnerabilities with the
goal of implementing stronger security measures on the internet.145
Examples of these bug bounty programs’ recent success can be seen
through Google paying out more than $2.9 million in bounties in
2017, and Apple offering up to $200,000 for the identification of
certain vulnerabilities.146 The success of these large corporation’s
bug bounty programs led to the creation of the SECURE
Technology Act which compels the Department of Homeland
Security to establish a bug-bounty pilot program.147
The expansion of bounty programs to the online realm further
exemplifies the strength and success of these bounty programs. Not
only is the federal government using these programs to solve crimes
committed on the physical streets of the United States, but now the
federal government is expanding these programs to the internet due
to the results seen from the various other bounty programs to help
prevent hackers from infiltrating governmental systems and large
corporations online. Federal bounty programs may potentially cross
ethical boundaries, however it is arguable these programs are
absolutely essential for the most effective way of catching criminals

144

Myles Ashong, Bug the Bounty Hunter: Recommendations to Congress to
Best Effectuate the Purpose of the SECURE TECHNOLOGY Act, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_contract_law/publications/public_c
ontract_law_jrnl/49-1/secure-tech/.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
False Claims Act, The National Whistleblower Center,
https://www.whistleblowers.org/protect-the-false-claims-act/.
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on the internet and historically elusive criminals involved in crimes
such as CP and human trafficking.
Other examples of bounty programs include the program in
relation to the False Claims Act which provides rewards for
informants who report frauds committed upon the government.148
Sources state that the False Claims Act is one of the strongest
whistleblower laws in the United States.149 If the whistleblower’s
information results in a successful prosecution, whistleblowers
receive a mandatory reward of 15% to 30% of the collected
proceeds.150 Similar bounty programs that share the same goals and
success as the False Claims Act whistleblower program include: the
SEC Whistleblower program, the CFTC Whistleblower Reward
Program, and the Anti-Money Laundering Whistleblower reward
program.151
The SEC Whistleblower program actually just issued their
largest bounty award to date in 2020 with the reward totaling $114
million dollars to a whistleblower whose information led to a
successful prosecution.152 Further, “the SEC has awarded
approximately $676 million to 108 individuals since issuing its first
award in 2012.”153 The publication and press on the large rewards
awarded, such as the SEC award to a whistleblower in 2020, will
only increase individual’s motivation to participate and will
ultimately only enhance the success of the bounty programs.
After reviewing the results of the bounty program examples
provided above, bounty programs appear to be effective. Citizens
likely know their communities better and on a more personal level
than the government, therefore the citizens may catch things that the
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Jason Zuckerman & Matthew Stock, What is a Whistleblower Reward?,
Zuckerman Law (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/sp_faq/whatis-a-whistleblower-reward/.
152
SEC Issues Record $114 Million Whistleblower Award, U.S. Securities &
Exchange Commission (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-266.
153
Id.
149
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government is unable to. The citizens' ability to know their
communities better and the fact that they are more likely to be aware
of situations of CP means that enlisting citizens to voluntarily
inform law enforcement would likely increase law enforcement
effectiveness in tackling CP significantly. The number of rewards
issued to citizens and the number of tips provided are a testament to
the effectiveness of a federal bounty hunter system. Notably, the
rewards are only issued for successful prosecutions. Therefore, the
numerous rewards issued yearly under the discussed programs may
show insight into what is possible with the use of a CP bounty hunter
system. The U.S. would not be considering the expansion of such
systems into other areas of crimes if they were not successful and
effective. Thus, adding CP into the continuous expansion of these
bounty programs would seem to be an appropriate next step in the
expansion path and in tackling CP.
B. Proposed Systems to Deter CP

Reporting and deterring child pornography can be potentially
improved in different ways. They include (1) prioritizing preteen
CP because they are the most vulnerable population and as children
gain greater autonomy it is difficult to assess between free will and
forced acts; (2) funding and use of a federal bounty hunter or tipster
program as discussed earlier; (3) licensing of private researchers to
corroborate law enforcement claims; (4) a private bounty hunter
system; and (5) the U.S. Supreme Court could consider allowing
courts to compel production of a defendant’s password or
decryption key as a deterrent to CP.
1. Prioritize Preteen CP

In terms of priorities, we propose that for any improved
deterrence or reporting system (whether government run or
privately operated) young victims should be the highest priority,
such as CP involving victims 12 and under (i.e., preteens). This is
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consistent with Henzey’s view that so-called juvenile self-produced
child porn should be classified as a low-level misdemeanor.154
Prioritizing a younger group will help a clearly extremely
vulnerable age group. Children of this age group are more likely to
be abused and exploited.155 Children are four times more likely to
be trafficked by family members than adults are to be trafficked.156
The main reason for child human trafficking, especially for girls, is
forced sexual exploitation.157 The larger issue with this form of
human trafficking is that it is often conducted at home where
children are more likely to be coerced and psychologically abused
to accept the sexual exploitation.158 Per one study, almost thirty
percent of girls who are trafficked are under the age of 11 and
approximately another twenty percent of girls being between the
ages of 12 and 14.159 For boys who are trafficked, approximately
fifty percent of them are under the age of 11 and approximately
another twenty percent are between the age of 12 and 14.160 Looking
at these numbers, while boys are less likely to be trafficked for
sexual exploitation, a large portion of these children are subjected
to child pornography, whether that be by being filmed and
photographed while sexually exploited or exploited for the main
purpose of child pornography.161 The CP materials that come out of
154

Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11
APPLACHIAN J.L. 1, 2 (2011).
155
National Center for Victims of Crime, Child Sexual Abuse Statistics,
https://victimsofcrime.org/child-sexual-abuse-statistics/.
156
Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC), Age of Victims: Children
and Adults, “Recruiter Relationship Adults and Children”, (2021)
https://www.ctdatacollaborative.org/story/age-victims-children-and-adults.
157
CTDC, Exploitation of Victims: Trends, (2021),
https://www.ctdatacollaborative.org/story/exploitation-victims-trends.
158
The Children’s Assessment Center, Child Sexual Abuse Facts and
Resources, https://cachouston.org/prevention/child-sexual-abuse-facts/.
159
CTDC, Age of Victims: Children and Adults, “Age of Identified Girls and
Boys”, supra note 158.
160
Id.; See also The Children’s Assessment Center, supra note 160.
161
CTDC, Exploitation of Victims: Trends, supra note 159; See generally The
Children’s Assessment Center, Child Sexual Abuse Facts and Resources, supra
note 160; See also Luzwick, supra note 27, at 366.
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human trafficking are the egregious photographs and videos that
need to be targeted to end the distribution of CP and tackle CP on a
wholistic level.
Preteens ostensibly have less cognitive ability to consent to
any sexual interactions and the less awareness of what is happening
to them compared to teens.162 Although teens can certainly be
victims, selecting a low age cutoff would likely filter out what
would be classified as a low-level misdemeanor if the photos and
videos were self-produced by sexually active teenagers. Many older
children are still exploited for child pornography and sexual
exploitation, but the mix of independent judgement and the
activities of older children online makes separating exploitation and
the regular activity of teens harder to distinguish.163 Thus, in order
to protect children unable to make these independent judgements
and tackle an area of child pornography effectively and
successfully, the suggestion in this article is to prioritize children
age 12 and younger (e.g., highest awards paid for convictions
relating to preteen victims). Accordingly, CP involving preteen
victims could be the highest priority for detection and deterrence.
Another issue to consider is the prioritization of what type
of child pornography content to search and report both from a law
enforcement and private bounty hunter standpoint. For example,
Henzey suggests that self-produced teen images (e.g., shared
between high school classmates) should not be pursued when more
egregious content may be hunted (e.g., sexual abuse of toddlers).164
It would certainly seem strange, and invasive, to have private
bounty hunters sifting through the social media content of high
schoolers. Thus, a bounty program could have the greatest societal
benefit and effectiveness in combating CP if it were to focus on the
distribution of suspected CP images rather than self-produced
162

CTDC, Exploitation of Victims: Trends, supra note 159.
Ling-Hsiang Wang, Credibility Judgment Predictors for Child Sexual Abuse
Reports in Forensic Psychiatric Evaluations, National Library of Medicine,
Vol. 16(2) (February 16, 2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6393749/.
164
Henzey, supra note 156, at 28-29.
163
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content shared between sexually active teens, albeit these selfproduced shared photos might be found elsewhere due to revenge
or some other motive but that is an issue to tackle at another time.
A technology platform and organization called Thorn,
founded by Ashton Kutcher and Demi Moore, aims to help law
enforcement reduce trafficking of minors. Thorn’s research
discusses the most vulnerable victims are those under the age of
12.165 After speaking to survivors of sexual exploitation, the
organization found that the average age of victims entering sex
trafficking was 14-15, and at that age group the involvement of a
minor speaking to the buyer substantially increases (with the
trafficker typically handling communications with sex buyers for
preteen victims).166 In one of their survivor interviews, an
individual noted being born into the system and that escaping was
almost an impossible task.167 A significant number of teen victims
are found to have been exploited prior to their teen years, in
essentially a grooming process for victims extending through their
teen years.168 This raises the possibility of traffickers distributing
CP images of preteen victims as an advertising tool to attract buyers.
Thus, any reporting incentives of preteen images might have some
impact in terms of reducing sex trafficking of minors and perhaps
make it more difficult for a trafficker to groom and advertise preteen
victims to potential buyers given a higher risk of getting caught
based on rewarding the public for reporting. In theory, an
anonymous reward system with substantially high rewards could
potentially encourage a purchaser of a preteen victim to report the
trafficker (and certainly such a system could contemplate whether
and to what extent such an anonymous tipster might be shielded
from liability if anonymity were compromised).
The ICMEC have also made their own missing child alert
system. The system shares case information, child information
accessible to the public, generates leads for investigators using
165

Thorn, https://www.thorn.org/survivor-insights/.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
166
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facial recognition to match missing child photos to data found on
both the clear and dark web, and more.169 This raises the possibility
that if some form of tipster reward (either transparent or anonymous
reward) might increase reporting across the board for both teen and
preteen minor victims.
Certainly, further research exploring any relationship
between CP and sex trafficking of minors would provide helpful
insight.
2. Funding of a Federal Bounty Hunter System or Tipster
Reward Program

Funding for a reward system could come from tech
platforms that provide warrant-proof encryption and meet a
minimum annual revenue. Funding from such platforms may be fair
if they are providing platforms that facilitate secret sharing of CP
(although the ostensible purpose is to promote privacy). Such
platforms may contribute via charitable donations and/or a CP tax
or perhaps a tax credit. A modest CP tax could be imposed on large
tech platforms that provide warrant-proof encryption and have
substantial annual revenue. Alternatively, users could potentially
pay the tax (through their ISP). The tax revenue could be used to
fund tipster programs and/or hiring of additional law enforcement
investigators in the area of online CP, especially given law
enforcement’s claim that it is only prosecuting the tip of the iceberg.
In addition, such funding might also be used for victim support,
such as counseling, education, etc.
A conventional tipster reward program seems feasible,
where a financial reward can be awarded for reporting information
leading to arrest and conviction of a U.S. person
possessing/distributing preteen CP. Requiring a conviction would
tend to prevent the Cobra Effect of a reward making the problem
worse (e.g., increasing the production of preteen CP so that tipsters

169

International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, Powering the
Search for Missing Children, https://www.icmec.org/support-us/impact/.
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can collect a reward for reporting).170 Further, the problem of
increased online offerings of CP to U.S. persons may develop if
offerors can collect a reward by providing a tip that convicts the
recipient for receipt). A tipster program could be operated by
NICMIC and/or other public or private entities to financially
incentivize reporting of child pornography involving young victims.
A tipster reward program can be funded by private donors or
through taxation, particularly donations by or taxes imposed on tech
platforms providing warrant proof encryption.
An anonymous tipster reward program could be feasible, if
it might increase reporting among witnesses reluctant to
transparently report, but such a program would need appropriate
technical and administrative safeguards to facilitate anonymity. An
example of a private anonymous crime reporting system based out
of California is https://wetip.com/ This organization has an
infrastructure to support rewards for anonymous crime reporting
(but it does not solicit reports of child pornography). Advertising of
a tipster program could be provided on social media platforms or
elsewhere, such as in schools.171 The question is whether an
anonymous private crime reporting system for child pornography is
feasible in terms of how important is it for a reporting party to
identify herself? Certainly, one risk might involve false reporting in
170

For a general description of the Cobra Effect, See Cobra Effect, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_effect (last updated March 12,
2021)(describing the Cobra Effect as occurring “when incentives designed to
solve a problem end up rewarding people for making it worse. The term is used
to illustrate how incorrect stimulation in economics and politics can cause
unintended consequences. It is also known as the perverse incentive. The term
cobra effect originated in an anecdote that describes an occurrence during India
under British Rule. The British government was concerned about the number of
venomous cobras in Delhi. The government therefore offered a bounty for every
dead cobra. Initially, this was a successful strategy; large numbers of snakes
were killed for the reward. Eventually, however, enterprising people began to
breed cobras for the income. When the government became aware of this, the
reward program was scrapped. When cobra breeders set their now-worthless
snakes free, the wild cobra population further increased.”
171
The Thorn report, discussed above, identifies schools as a helpful institution
for intervention with regard to sex trafficking of minors; thus, schools might
also be helpful institutions for detecting victims of CP.
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order to harm another person’s reputation or subject that person to
an unfounded investigation (a concept similar to the swatting
phenomenon that law enforcement regularly faces).172 Another
hurdle that might need to be cleared is whether the organization is
authorized to solicit the public for illegal content to be used as
evidence without violating the CP statute.
3. Licensing of Private Researchers to Corroborate Law
Enforcement Claims

The number of preteen CP that occurs across the world is
severely underreported. In the early 2000s, almost a hundred
countries around the world either had no laws addressing child
pornography or inadequate laws addressing CP.173 By 2012, there
were still 53 countries that did not have any CP laws.174 Since 2012
there has not been much improvement in CP laws across the world.
The ICMEC has stated the insufficiency of CP laws is a large
contributing factor to why the number of CP acts is so large, and
likely underreported.175
The five criteria required by the ICMEC to be in compliance
with ICMEC recommended sufficient CP laws include: having
existing laws with a legal definition of CP; making CP a crime;
172

For a general discussion of the swatting phenomenon, see 64 DRAKE L. REV.
455 (2016)
Swatting: The New Cyberbullying Frontier after Elonis v. United States, Jaffe,
Elizabeth M.
(describing “the prankster convinces a police dispatcher to send an
entire SWAT team in response to a [fabricated] violent scenario allegedly in
progress.”).
173
LifeSite, New Study Reveals Child Pornography Not a Crime In Most
Countries, LifeSiteNews.com, (Jun. 19, 2021, 11:15 PM),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/new-study-reveals-child-pornography-nota-crime-in-most-countries/.
174
Id.
175
The International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children, Despite Increase
in Global Child Protection Laws Many Countries Still Do Not Consider Child
Pornography a Crime, PR Newswire, (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/despite-increase-in-global-childprotection-laws-many-countries-still-do-not-consider-child-pornography-acrime-200036181.html.
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whether or not distribution of CP via computer and the internet is a
crime; making possession of CP a crime; and whether or not ISPs
are required to report suspected CP to law enforcement.176 Of the
countries reviewed in the 2012 report, only 22 countries sufficiently
met compliance with the recommended sufficient CP laws.177 Only
69 countries around the world meet at least 4 of the recommended
criteria (considered “sufficient laws”) including the United
States.178
Notably, the Western countries are significant players in the
proliferation of CP. Germany has been noted as one of the
significant makers of child pornography and the most significant
disseminating countries include the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom.179 The largest market and countries with CP consumers
include the United States and Southeast Asia.180 With Western
countries being the most technologically advanced and capable of
combating CP and being significant players in the proliferation of
CP, countries like the United States should increase efforts to
combat CP.
Considering the lack of consistent global support to prevent
CP, there are few other avenues left to try to combat CP. Enlisting
private researchers to corroborate law enforcement claims would
help these countries which only meet the minimum requirements set
by the ICMEC. Enlisting private researchers would also help
understand the magnitude of CP crimes and acts happening across
the world and within respective countries.
A licensed private researcher system should be established
so that independent third-party researchers can corroborate law
enforcement’s claims regarding the amount and type of CP
176

Id.
Id.
178
Id.
179
Deepa Salian and Sofia Khatun, Legal Framework on Child Pornography: A
Perspective, Intech Open, (May 28, 2020),
https://www.intechopen.com/profiles/320459.
180
Id.
177
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produced annually. Such independent corroboration seems
particularly vital given that society is recovering from the narrative
concerning the war on drugs (e.g., asserting marijuana as an
inescapable gateway to other drugs). Along these lines, it is
important for society to have solid data about the extent of CP and
what proportion of it involves young pre-teen children versus CP
self-produced by sexually active teenagers versus teenagers
victimized by a third-party adult.
Corroboration of law enforcement claims is critical in order
to have well informed decision making. Essentially, history teaches
that law enforcement can offer an exaggerated narrative at times for
varying reasons. This article does not suggest that the FBI’s claims
are false, but instead asserts that independent verification of those
claims seems an important safeguard. As noted earlier in the article
law enforcement and some authoritarian regimes have been known
to fear monger and over exaggerate claims such as those related to
marijuana. In 1930, Harry Anslinger was appointed the first
commissioner of the FBI whose work set up the framework for the
war on drugs and racist ideology surrounding drug crimes.181
Without corroboration of evidence, work completed by law
enforcement may be chasing down unsubstantiated cases and
claims. Licensing private researchers to corroborate law
enforcement evidence should help address this issue, and care
should be taken that any licensed private researchers have the ability
and mission to provide objective, unbiased research rather than
being paid to provide research results to simply reinforce a
particular narrative provided by the government granting the
research license.
4. A Private Bounty Hunter System May Not Be Practical
but Should Not Be Ruled Out

181

Cydney Adams, The man behind the marijuana ban for all the wrong
reasons, CBS News (November 17, 2016, 5:45 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/harry-anslinger-the-man-behind-the-marijuanaban/#app.
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Individuals should continue to explore private solutions to
CP because law enforcement cannot fix the problem unless
communities opted to become police states. A private bounty hunter
system seems less feasible based on law enforcement concerns, such
as the credibility of vigilantes when placed on the witness stand.
Major problems with a private bounty hunter system may include
the following: (1) a Cobra Effect where a bounty system makes the
problem worse, (2) legal issues with credibility of a bounty hunter
in a criminal prosecution, and (3) potential embarrassment to law
enforcement based on deputized private parties having lower ethical
standards/less training than experienced law enforcement
personnel. However, such a crowd sourced system should not be
ruled out.
Another issue is whether law enforcement authorizing a
private bounty hunter to hack the perpetrator’s system takes the
bounty hunter outside of the private search doctrine (and thus would
likely require a warrant given that licensure would require a fair
amount of law enforcement supervision of a private bounty
hunter).182 Essentially, the licensing of a bounty hunter could make
that hunter an agent of the government, which could require the
hunter to obtain a warrant in order to hack the perpetrator’s identity.
This administrative hurdle could slow the bounty hunter’s progress,
especially if time is of the essence. Perhaps a statutory provision
could provide immunity for the hunter’s hacking activity upon his
verification of CP content or activities.
Regarding licensure of private bounty hunters, various
issues should be considered. First, can the license permit a private
bounty hunter to solicit the illegal content given that 18 U.S.C.

182

See Andrew MacKie-Mason, The Private Search Doctrine after Jones, 126
YALE L.J. F. 326, 326 (2016-2017)(describing the private search doctrine: “once
a private party has conducted an initial search independent of the government,
the government may repeat that search, even if doing so would otherwise violate
the Fourth Amendment. The private party's search renders the subsequent
government "search" not a search in the constitutional sense.”).
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2252A generally prohibits soliciting the material?183 (Likewise, a
federal license would need to exempt prosecution under any
relevant state law as well.) Next, assuming bounty hunters were
granted this authority to solicit, care should be taken that they are
not creating a market for the creation of child pornography; for
example, one could imagine a bounty hunter offering one hundred
dollars for an image, which then induces someone (say in a third
world country) to then sexually abuse a child and record it.
Licensure of bounty hunter activities should thus be carefully
monitored so as to avoid creating a market or even creating
entrapment situations.
Another issue to consider is whether private bounty hunters,
upon detecting child pornography, could then be empowered to
hack the perpetrator’s systems to determine his identity given that
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act generally prohibits
unauthorized hacking activity.184 While passive detection would
certainly seem allowable, hacking activity could be problematic in
terms of harming innocent bystanders.185 Henzey proposed in 2011
a strict liability system for hacking suspected CP perpetrators, but
the problems of allowing hacking activity by private parties, even
licensed private parties, certainly poses some risks of harming
innocent bystanders.186 In addition, a strict liability system would
not help innocent victims of the hacking activity if the vigilante
lacks the funds to compensate such victims. Allowing private
bounty hunters to hack into individuals’ computers has multiple
183
U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008)(noting that 18 U.S.C.
2252A(a)(3)(B) “criminalizes, in certain specified circumstances, the pandering
or solicitation of child pornography.”)
184
See Don Maclean, The Problems with Hacking Back, AFCEA International
(May 30, 2018), https://www.afcea.org/content/problems-hacking-back (noting
that the problems with hacking back may outweigh the perceived benefits
because the hacking back activity may harm innocent bystanders).
185
Id.
186
Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of
Internet Child Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 67 (2011)(suggesting that applicable law should “make
the hacker strictly liable if she misidentifies as a target someone who is not
engaged in trafficking child porn.”).
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potential liability issues. The hacker may not be able to effectively
locate a perpetrator and consequently hack an innocent bystander
which may lead to destruction of the innocent bystander’s files and
data systems or other unintended consequences.187 With the proper
safeguards and support to hackers serving to locate CP and
perpetrators, some of these consequences and need for
compensation could be addressed.
The feasibility of such a system could be further explored,
particularly if data suggests that a large number of preteens are
being victimized in CP, and if law enforcement could build a
successful, prosecutable investigation based on crowdsourced
bounty hunting activity. A private crowdsourced enforcement
option could be a highly effective deterrent, but it would first require
corroboration of law enforcement’s narrative and then it would need
to be designed in such a way that it would avoid doing more harm
than good (e.g., avoid criminal CP solicitation violations or harmful
offensive hacking activity by well-intentioned vigilantes).
There are organizations that team up with law enforcement
to help with community policing and regulation. An example of
such an organization is InfraGard which is a partnership between
the FBI and members of the private sector to provide protection for
the U.S. Critical Infrastructure.188 The competing interests of
communities and law enforcement of privatizing law enforcement
and protecting communities creates friction between the two parties.
This friction sets up a question that communities must decide:
should privatization of security and law enforcement roles be a
primarily government function? Considering this friction and the
question faced by communities, a private bounty hunter system
should be considered.
Other well-known examples include Google and Facebook
collaborating with law enforcement. A further example includes the
private entity Thorn developing its Spotlight software with free
187

Don Maclean, The Problems with Hacking Back, AFCEA International,
(May 30, 2018), https://www.afcea.org/content/problems-hacking-back.
188
InfraGard, Partnership for Protection, https://www.infragard.org/.
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access by law enforcement to facilitate child trafficking
investigations (with some quotes from law enforcement praising its
helpfulness on Thorn’s site).189 It would seem that exploration of
financial incentives for private entities (and conceivably individual
private actors) might further inspire private parties to combat online
CP (beyond purely altruistic motives).
5. Courts Could Consider Allowing Compelled Production
of a Defendant’s Password or Decryption Key as a Deterrent
to CP, but this may Violate the Fifth Amendment

As a final thought, additional courts could hold that
defendants can be compelled to turn over their decryption key or
password (i.e., pursuant to a warrant) under appropriate
circumstances without violating the Fifth Amendment, treating the
password as equivalent to a physical key rather than selfincriminating testimony. From a policy standpoint, this would seem
a fair compromise in terms of generally respecting privacy of
consumer data but allowing for a judicial order to access a suspect’s
data in the face of probable cause that CP is on the machine. Such a
balance avoids the many problems of mandating a decryption back
door, and courts may consider invasive electronic searches only
where serious suspected crimes are at issue (e.g., felonies such as
CP) based on evidence supporting a high likelihood of defendant
committing the crime. Along these lines, courts might lean toward
denying requests for invasive searches where certain low-level
misdemeanor crimes are suspected (e.g., perhaps illegal gambling
or ordinary prostitution), but override privacy concerns where more
serious CP criminal activity is suspected. Certainly, the Supreme
Court has historically allowed special Fourth Amendment
exceptions for officer safety and for schools.190 (Granted, searching
a minor seems different from searching an adult.) So, perhaps a
Fifth Amendment exception could be explored where compelled
password protection is allowable in the limited context of CP?
189

Thorn, https://spotlight.thorn.org/about
For some historical context of searches in schools, See Stuart C. Berman,
Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. SchoolSearch Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
190
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However, this may not be feasible as the Fifth Amendment is a
powerful constitutional protection even where the most serious
crimes are at issue (e.g., even a murder charge does not justify
compelled self-incriminating testimony).
As of this writing, SCOTUS has declined certiorari on the
issue of compelled password production in the criminal context. The
majority of lower courts agree that sharing a password with law
enforcement is a testimonial act because it compels information
from a person’s mind.191 Where the courts and scholars disagree,
however, is in cases where the suspect is compelled to unlock a
device without communicating the password, whether the foregone
conclusion doctrine applies to the password itself, or the documents
and files the password protects. Some courts, like the majorities in
Commonwealth v. Davis and Pollard v. State are hesitant to apply
the foregone conclusion doctrine to the password, and not the
phone’s files, without express guidance from the Supreme Court.192
Others, like the dissent in Davis, or the court in State v. Andrews,
find that the foregone conclusion test applies to the production of

191

Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (“Forcing a
defendant to disclose a password, whether by speaking it, writing it down, or
physically entering it into a cellphone, compels information from that person's
mind and thereby falls within the core of what constitutes a testimonial
disclosure.”); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1273 (2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2623 (2021) (“A cellphone's passcode is analogous to the combination to
a safe, not a key. Communicating or entering a passcode requires facts
contained within the holder's mind -- the numbers, letters, or symbols
composing the passcode. It is a testimonial act of production.”); Commonwealth
v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 548 (2019) (“Based upon these cases rendered by the
United States Supreme Court regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment, we
conclude that compelling the disclosure of a password to a computer, that is, the
act of production, is testimonial.”); United States v. Spencer, No. 17-CR-00259CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018) (“For instance, the
government could not compel Spencer to state the password itself, whether
orally or in writing.”).
192
Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 550 (2019); Pollard v. State, 287
So. 3d 649, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
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the passcodes themselves, rather than to the phones’ contents.193
SCOTUS declined certiorari in State v. Andrews, leaving the
exactness of the foregone conclusion doctrine for password
compulsion unsettled law.
As courts grapple with this issue, they will likely continue
to ponder the words of Justice Stevens from his dissent in Doe v.
U.S.: “A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence
that is incriminating. Fingerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars,
handwriting specimens, or other items of physical evidence may be
extracted from a defendant against his will. But can he be compelled
to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a
crime? I think not. He may in some cases be forced to surrender a
key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do not
believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall
safe—by word or deed.”194
In deciding whether and to what extent a Fifth Amendment
exception could be carved out in the CP context, courts will
certainly consider a variety of factors, such as the likelihood of
defendant engaging in the alleged activity based on the strength of
evidence, the minimal independent testimonial value of the
password itself, the necessity of compelling disclosure given
society’s interest in protecting vulnerable children, the ability or
lack of ability to obtain the evidence by other means, the likelihood
of such compelled disclosure being used as a pretext for detecting
crimes unrelated to CP, and whether there might be a lower
expectation of privacy where the government discovers that
defendant has communicated with or about minors in an
inappropriate way. Perhaps courts might consider whether
compelling the password’s production in a particular case would
support the government’s ability to engage in fishing expeditions
against a broad swath of individuals or instead seems based on
193
Commonwealth v. Davis, 656 Pa. 213, 248 (2019) (Baer, J., dissenting);
State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447, 478 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2623
(2021).
194
Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 219 (U.S.1988).
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strong suspicion targeting one criminal defendant in appropriate
circumstances?
CONCLUSION

The foregoing is intended to stimulate further discussion
regarding strategies to combat proliferation of CP given that law
enforcement may never have a mandatory legislative encryption
back door. The tension between privacy interests and the need to
combat terrorism, CP, and other serious crimes will continue to exist
far into the future. Certainly, technology has created new avenues
for perpetrators to hide behind or for innocent actors to maintain
strong privacy. Policy makers will continue to struggle with the
question of where to draw the line between protecting privacy in
society while detecting and preventing serious crimes. Providing
law enforcement with too much power would resemble a society
policed by an authoritarian regime. However, a free society making
no significant attempt to detect and prevent serious crimes against
children would be repulsive.
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